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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation is a collection of three essays related to the urbanization-
industrialization nexus and its welfare impact in Indonesia. In the first essay I evaluate the 
connection between access to productive farm lands and farming households’ livelihood in 
rapidly urbanizing rural areas. Using data from Indonesian Family Livelihood Survey (IFLS), I 
test whether farming households who lose landholdings in urbanizing regions have significantly 
lower income and consumption change over time compared to their peer households who 
maintain land in a relatively unchanging region. Tested with double difference and propensity 
score matching techniques, I find that the event of losing land, especially under the circumstance 
of rapid urbanization, often leads to a shock in farming households’ income and consumption. In 
the second essay, I evaluate the relationship between the spatial configuration of urbanization 
and poverty. I hypothesize that in the short term, corporatized type urban development—typified 
by more rapid and clustered conversions of rural farmlands—can predict the incidence of 
poverty. Through analysis of enhanced vegetation index (EVI), I classify land satellite imageries 
to evaluate land-cover changes in Salatiga, Indonesia and visualize the rural urbanization 
process. Using spatial regression techniques, I find that the rate of urbanization is not correlated 
to new poverty. However, the clustering of urban change is very positively correlated to the 
addition of new individuals to the list of poor people in the region. This research provides an 
empirical support for spatial policies with a social policy insight: protection of farmlands during 
rapid rural urbanization, protection of farming jobs and public/communitarian access to farming 
lands, and selective implementation to land use changes by major developers. The third essay 
concerns the discrepancy between bureaucratic planning’s vision on the region’s economic 
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future and the economic needs of their constituents. Using mixed-methods approach with 
interviews, focus group discussions, and reviews of planning documents and regional statistics, I 
explore the multidimensional mismatches between planning and the public’s perspective. I argue 
that such mismatch is a result of required transformations demanded by the interest of capital—I 
call this “capital conditioning”. Planning plays a key role in making sure that the locality meets 
capital conditions through four processes: alteration of perceived future and vision, compression 
of time frame for expected change, restructuring of legal and perceptual definition of locality, 
and redefining the role(s) of the State. 
 
Keywords: rural; urbanization; land-use; poverty; agriculture; capital; planning; public interest 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THE AGENDA 
 
In 2009, hundreds of landless farmers in Salatiga, a small city in Central Java, Indonesia, 
organized a mass protest at the city’s House of Representatives (DPRD). They showed their 
goats and cows, and intentionally let them fed on the DPRD garden’s exotic grass. They paraded 
large banners, made of modest shroud fabrics with expressions of grief: “You want development, 
do not victimize us”; “Mr. Mayor, keep in mind we are still farmers”; “You evict farmers… for 
whose prosperity?”; “Land swap for whose profit?”; “My head aches thinking of (how I can 
afford) animal food (while) the DPRD is clogged up (for grassroots activism)”; “My cow is 
lanky, too difficult to find grass feed because of your land swap”; etc. 
 
The root of the protest was the city’s ambition to promote manufacturing industry 
establishments, constrained by what small area they have. The City of Salatiga is literally 
contained within the County of Semarang, which has a separate and independent authority over 
land use designations. For the city administration, every inch of land is a valuable resource that 
can be turned into monetary profits in corporate taxes and development/licensing fees. Thus the 
city has the incentives to incorporate surrounding villages and change their legal status from 
rural regions into urban administrative areas as part of the city. 
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The incorporation allows the city to legally determine the fate of a larger region, but does 
not directly give the city administration the property rights over those lands. The critical point 
comes when the city claims right over community-owned (bengkok) lands. The administrative 
shift, from rural to urban administration over incorporated regions, allows the city to claim 
ownership on what was previously owned by the community or the village. It also allows the city 
administration to transfer rights over those properties to real estate developers and factory 
owners, a plan that is largely justified by the narrative of job creation and poverty reduction.  
 
But much of the existing open and contiguous plots of public lands are ex-community-
owned lands that have been used for farming purposes for many generations. Many families are 
dependent on agricultural livelihood, either farming or cattle raising. A significant portion of 
agricultural families in the incorporated regions are landless. They are dependent on public 
provision of land (previously communally provided) to cultivate cassava and vegetables for 
household consumption or Napier grass for cattle fodder. Designating public lands for industrial 
purposes means displacing many landless farmers from the only land that they can use for 
cultivation purposes. For many families, displacing them from public farm lands means 
depraving them from agricultural livelihood altogether. 
 
The story of Salatiga is an example of, not the exception to, the land use conflict that 
often happens on the path to large-scale, large-capital development projects. More and more 
often, administrators, mayors, and governors alike are pressed by the interest of capital to 
provide land concessions in return to capital investments in their locality. But most state 
apparatus do not have land of their own, or within their administration’s ownership. Thus the 
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way they make these land concessions are by using their state-vested powers to displace (and 
sometimes dispossess) people from the land and the properties they live, settle, or work in. This 
practice is very similar to eminent domain in the US context of governance over land use 
designations. 
 
The story of Salatiga is also an example of the sudden livelihood-related challenges 
during rural-urban transformation. Since we live in the era of global capitalism and planetary 
urbanization, the geographic and administrative boundaries of what is urban and rural slowly 
disappear. More physical development in the rural areas and city fringes speed up new waves of 
urban transformation. But the lives of the people who live in what was previously “rural” and 
what is becoming “urban” does not change as fast. It takes more than a lifetime to acquire a new 
job skill and be fit in a new job for people who have spent most of their time doing one particular 
type of work. This is especially true for agricultural workers. 
 
Human beings are sluggish adapters, and rightfully so. It is unrealistic to expect that 
people who are displaced can change their life as fast as the movement of capital or the way state 
entities react to capital and its need for land resources. Capital owners have the great freedom to 
decide where to invest. But people have complicated life circumstances to make decisions on 
where to live or work. Thus displacement from land can create social problems of unemployment 
and poverty. This is especially true when that particular land is the sole factor to household 
production, such as when the household is dependent on agricultural livelihood. 
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I decided to address the problem of land use conflict during rural-urban transformation by 
exploring three modest topics. First, it is important to understand the magnitude of the problem. 
By focusing my analysis on the people who are displaced from farm land during rural-urban 
transformation, I try to understand how much in terms of income and consumption is lost for 
each household. This information is important not only because it helps policy makers to grasp 
the gravity of the issue. It also helps them create a measureable evaluation criteria to understand 
the real social cost of development policies that require land-based interventions, such as 
industrial land use designation on farm areas.  
 
Second, I aim at providing policy makers with an instrument to identify the urban spatial 
configurations related to new poverty incidences. I focus my analysis on understanding the 
relationship between the spatial configuration of urbanization, the scale of urban development 
projects, and regional poverty incidence. Large-scale development projects, when observed from 
a bird’s eye-view, will have a distinctly centralized, often contiguous spatial urban configuration. 
The scale of urban development projects is often closely associated to how much open land is 
required to accommodate it. Thus it will be very closely associated with how much farm land 
will need to be converted to urban uses and how many people to be displaced from the respective 
farm lands. Displacement from farm lands can create temporary and permanent loss of 
livelihood, and can throw many families into poverty. Understanding how well the spatial 
configuration of urban development predicts poverty incidence not only provides an insight for 
local governments to the social cost of urban development. Rather, it provides an insight to the 
social cost of urban development with permanent labor and livelihood dislocations. 
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Third, it is important to help policy makers to step back and think about what went wrong 
with these policies, beyond the technicality of policy analysis. It’s important to ask reflective 
questions: Why do planning agencies create economic development projects that are against the 
economic needs of their constituents? This question needs to be treated as a policy question 
rather than a rhetorical statement. Therefore, it requires an empirical inquiry that evaluates 
planning through the looking glass. I argue that it is valuable to see planning for urban 
transformation using the lens of capital interest. Planning does not operate in a vacuum. By 
understanding what kinds of capital interests it serves, we can shed light on how planning plays a 
key role in ensuring the locality meets certain conditions necessary for wealth accumulation. 
 
1.2 THE EMPIRICAL WORK 
 
Covering the three agenda is challenging for two reasons: One challenge is that each 
agenda requires different (and diverging) methodology and research design. Each agenda 
requires separate data collection processes. Each of the data collected also requires completely 
different types of analysis, ranging from qualitative methods of content analysis to quantitative 
methods of semiparametric estimations and spatial regressions. 
The other challenge is that working on these three agenda means engaging in three 
different discourses within separate academic and professional silos of knowledge. Trying to 
measure the impact of urban displacement means borrowing much of impact evaluation methods 
and research designs from development economics. Drawing the relationship between the 
spatiality of urbanization and poverty means engaging with economic geography using analytical 
methods developed in spatial statistics. Exposing the problem with the commonsensical belief of 
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trickling down economic growth to legitimize dispossession means launching a three way 
conversation between planning theory, postcolonial scholarship, and historic materialism. 
Although they are not impossible projects to undertake, I humbly admit that it is a tall order to 
cover these three agenda. 
 
For the reasons above, I decided that it’s best to address this issue in three different 
essays, rather than a regular format of a dissertation. The first essay in this document concerns 
the magnitude of the urbanization impact on displaced people. I chose to answer this question by 
looking at two separate events that happens at two levels. The event of losing landholding —the 
right to use farm land for a certain amount of time for cultivation purposes—happens at the 
household level. Urbanization—the event in which the surrounding area experience physical 
upgrading in the built environment—happens at the regional (municipal or sub-district) level. 
Using national panel data of over 8000 households, I study the impact of either losing 
landholding or living in an urbanizing region on income and consumption of households that are 
dependent on agricultural livelihood. Then, I study the combined impact of these two events to 
simulate what happens to households who maintain in” agriculture while the region they live in 
start to change and they have to lose authorized access to exclusively cultivate on their land. 
 
The empirical challenge to the first essay is to justify the measure of the impact 
calculated in the analysis. To do so, a counterfactual—a “what if” situation where those 
households who actually lose land/live in urbanizing regions in the dataset does not lose land in 
hypothetical comparison groups—have to be created. I employ a simple difference-in difference 
(double-diff) design to measure the impact. A double-diff approach will separate the real impact 
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of losing land/urbanization on income/consumption change from the change that happens as a 
mere result of an unobserved trend. 
 
I paid specific attention to the comparability of the “treated” and “control” groups, a 
common concern in a quasi-experimental study like this. A propensity score matching (PSM) 
method was used to make sure that each treated and control households are as similar as 
possible. PSM basically assigned a matching score—a single real number that measures 
aggregate comparability—for each household. Aggregate comparability was estimated based on 
the following pre-treatment variables: household size, gender of the household head, household 
head’s education, the area of cultivable land owned/held, total farming assets, migration 
opportunity, and the quality of soil in the region. Instead of doing the analysis on all households 
as if they were all homogenous, I estimated the double-diff impact on pairs (or subsets) of 
households with matching scores as similar as possible. 
 
The second essay concerns the relationship between the spatial configuration of 
urbanization and regional poverty. The spatial configuration of urbanization speaks volumes 
about the fashion in which urban development takes place. A corporatized, capital intensive, 
large-scale physical development project, if observed from a bird’s eye view, will look like a 
huge spot on the ground. Meanwhile, urban development that happens as a result of family 
decisions to build on their own lands will look like small, dispersed spots. Studying the 
clustering or the dispersion of the urban fabric does not tell much about the urbanization trend. 
However, studying the clustering or the dispersion of changes in the urban fabric can provide an 
insight about the capital intensity of rural-urban transformation and the displacement that takes 
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place. Describing the correlation between quantitative measures of urban clustering or dispersion 
and regional poverty can be an intuitive guide for policy makers on which type of development is 
more economically inclusive and with less social cost. 
 
 The second essay descriptively explains which measure—either the rate at which 
physical change occurs or its spatial clustering—better predicts new regional poverty incidence. 
In layman’s term, this essay tries to find out whether: a) how much land use change occurs, or b) 
if it happens as a corporatized, capital intensive, large-scale development that displaces people; 
is potentially creating new poverty. For this purpose, I generate two metrics to be used in 
regression analysis methods. Using publicly available satellite images I evaluate spatial changes 
to generate measures of urbanization rate and clustering level. The urbanization rate represents 
the proportional change of land cover from predominantly agricultural into more urban use over 
a period of time. The clustering level represents spatial dependence—how clustered (or even 
contiguous) or dispersed physical land use change happens over time. The two metrics are then 
regressed against the number of newly poor people in each region. 
 
I pay specific attention to the possibility of regional spillovers. Displacement and poverty 
are social problems with spatial dimensions. Someone who is displaced from his/her land in one 
region may find agricultural work in an adjacent or nearby region—something that regional 
planners call a regional spillover effect. Therefore, the poverty impact in one region may reflect 
displacement in another region as well. To address this empirical challenge, I use two spatial 
regression methods (spatial lag and spatial error models) that will take into account regional 
spillover effects, in addition to the standard ordinary least square regression. 
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The third essay concerns the divergence between urban planning and the economic needs 
and interest of their local constituents. It presents the case study of Salatiga’s rural urbanization-
industrialization, and the incorporation of rural villages as the city’s strategy to acquire more 
land for development purposes. In this essay I discuss why this process is a state-sponsored land 
grab, how that land grab disfranchises rural farmers from access to public farm lands, and 
reorganizes the entire rural land use and allocations. 
In the third essay I focus in illuminating the role of the State in promoting rural-urban 
transformations to meet conditions demanded by the interest of capital. I argue that planning 
plays a key role in making sure that the locality meets capital conditions through four processes: 
First, planning alters the local perception of the region’s economic future and supplants it with a 
modernist vision. Second, it works to compress the time-frame for and expected change. Third, 
planning helps the State in restructuring legal and perceptual definitions of locality. Third and 
most importantly, it provides the State with new powers over land use designations and property 
rights, completely redefining the role(s) of the State in the locality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LAND MATTERS: RURAL URBANIZATION, PEASANT LANDHOLDINGS, AND 
HOUSEHOLD LIVELIHOOD IN INDONESIA 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
 
In this research I evaluate whether farmers’ loss of access to productive farm lands 
negatively affect their livelihood in rapidly urbanizing rural areas. I hypothesize that for farming 
households, the unfortunate event of losing farm landholding directly results in a medium term 
reduction in household income and consumption. The hypothesis comes from the observation 
that as the rural agricultural economy begins to shift to manufacturing, the rural environment will 
experience simultaneous changes, chief among them is land use conversion from farmlands to 
industrial, commercial, and residential functions. Much of the converted farmlands are 
community-trust or publicly-owned lands, that are either rented to industrialists or swapped with 
lower grade farming land in locations that are geographically further from existing farming 
communities. Such change often creates land pressures for agricultural communities, especially 
peasant households who suddenly lose access to community/publicly provided productive farm 
lands. Peasant farming households typically have limited job change opportunity because of their 
limited skills set. Using data from Indonesian Family Livelihood Survey (IFLS), I tested whether 
farming households who lose landholdings and live in urbanizing regions have significantly 
worse livelihood condition compared to their peers in similar situation. Tested with double 
difference and propensity score matching techniques, I found that the event of losing land, 
especially under the circumstance of rapid urbanization, often leads to a shock in farming 
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households’ income and consumption. Those phenomenon have received very little attention 
because established literatures in development economics tend to focus more on the long-term 
impact of structural changes in the economy. Most of the time, the social costs of such structural 
change, such as income loss for a significant proportion of the population, occur in the short and 
medium terms. However, they can bring long-term negative consequences to the welfare of 
affected households. Findings of this research calls for the protection of landless farming 
households who are dependent on publicly, communally or commercially provided land and are 
more vulnerable to the rapid, speculative, land use changing urbanization in the rural and 
peripheral areas. 
 
Keywords: rural, urbanization, land, landholdings, household income and consumption 
 
2.2 CONCERNS REGARDING URBANIZATION 
 
The rapid structural transformation in a developing country can be observed using two 
main indicators: the rates of change in economic structure and in population location. Data from 
Indonesia can be used as a prime example to demonstrate such transformation. In the last 15 
years Indonesia’s rural population has decreased from 49.7 to 39.4 percent, giving a rise to the 
new urban population. At the same period, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 20 
percent to slightly below 10 percent following the country’s growing manufacturing and services 
industry. These numbers illustrate that development occurs through two distinct but related 
processes: sectoral and spatial shift. 
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Such shifts resulted in dramatic changes in Indonesia’s land resources. Between 1990 and 
2010 Indonesia lost 24.1 million hectares of forest areas, mostly in Sumatera and Kalimantan. 
Some of these land lost could be attributed to rapid urbanization while some other was driven by 
new openings of palm plantations and logging (Wicke et al., 2011). While such change added 9.5 
million hectares to Indonesia’s agricultural land, only 8.3 million hectares were added to support 
permanent crops (FAO, 2014). Within this period, only 2.3 million hectares more land were 
developed to be equipped with irrigation. That development added to the 6.7 million hectares of 
already irrigated farm land, which is staggeringly small compared to the 24 million hectares of 
forest lost to urbanization. 
 
These numbers lead to an important question: Do changes in the rural environment create 
pressures for rural agricultural communities? This question becomes even more important 
because almost 40 million of Indonesia’s farmers are peasants—those who are landless and work 
in agricultural fields on small-scale operations (Partohardjono et al., 2005). Peasant households 
are hit harder and sooner than farmers with land tenure, because rapid urbanization in rural areas 
disproportionately increases their probability of losing access to publicly or communally 
provided productive farm land. Consequently, rural urbanization increases the likelihood of job 
and income loss for peasant households, an event which will further deteriorate their already 
meager livelihood. 
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2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.3.1. Economic Models of Rural-Urban Transformation 
 
A key component of the literature in development economics is its notion of urban-centered 
industrialization. In the traditional literature, industrialization is framed as the modernizing of the 
economy through substantial reallocation of human resources from a traditional, low-
productivity, rural-centered to a modern, high-productivity, urban-centered production. The 
notion of dualism in the development economics’ view of different forms of production sectors 
and their respective locations gives its famous name: the two sector model. 
 
The model dates back to the Nobel Laureate Arthur Lewis’s (1954, 1968) observation of 
a “labor surplus” in populous developing economies such as Egypt, India and Jamaica in the 
1950s. Most of these laborers worked in rural agriculture and could be transferred to urban 
manufacturing industries to speed up economic growth. The consequence of such transfer is the 
increasing gross domestic products (GDP) share of the more modern manufacturing industries 
and the decreasing share of traditional agriculture industries. Such turning point in the 
developing economy was separately observed by Kuznets (1955) and dubbed as the “inter-
sectoral shift”. 
 
The Lewisian notion of industrialization as structural change has aged really well. Many 
modern development economists have reiterated this notion of industrialization with slightly 
different approaches: emphasizing proportional changes in economic activity during such 
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“economic transformation” (Norton et al., 2010: 89); using the “two sector model” as the basis 
for analysis of migration and development patterns (e.g. Ranis & Fei, 1961; Harris & Todaro, 
1970; Todaro & Smith, 2009: 115); illustrating the total transformation of the entire rural-urban 
livelihoods as the consequence of structural economic transformation (Ray, 1998: 345), 
reassessing the relevance of the dualistic economic model (agriculture vs manufacturing) and 
rethinking about the modern fragmentation of economic activities (Ranis, 2003; Fields, 2004), 
and; rethinking the notion of labor surplus in the increasingly open economy (Ranis, 2004). 
 
 In contrast, Krugman’s (1991) new economic geography (NEG) employs a core-
periphery model. In NEG, there are not only two sectors, but also two regions. This distinction 
makes it very different from the two sector model, where essentially there are no physical cities, 
only a rather backward or modern sector. NEG views development as exogenously driven by 
improvement in rural-urban transportation. Consequently, the new economic geography model 
does not only capture the movement of labor from one economic sector to another. It also 
captures the population movement that will tend to create an urban concentration through 
migration. 
 
 More recent models of rural-urban transformation have focused on understanding growth 
as endogenously driven by the advancement of technology. Lucas (2004) has proposed that 
urbanization be viewed and modeled as the introduction of new technology, driven by human 
capital formation that will improve workers’ efficiency. This endogenous growth model has 
helped understanding both migration decisions of rural residents as well as their decision to 
invest in human capital (i.e. work skills) to catch up to the existing urban residents. 
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2.3.2. The Relationship between Urbanization, Welfare, and Poverty Reduction 
 
 Considerable empirical research supports the assumption that cities are associated with 
concentration of wealth, employment, knowledge and skills. For example, Eaton and Eckstein 
(1997: 443) concludes from their analysis of long range (>60 years) data on Japanese and French 
top 40 cities that larger cities have higher levels of human capital, higher rents and higher wages. 
This prediction holds even if workers are relatively homogeneous and inter-regional migration is 
not obstructed by any means. More importantly, this growth is endogenously driven by 
improvements in human capital. Migration-driven urbanization helps rural-urban migrants to 
acquire new skills as they arrive in the cities, and thus helps them to achieve higher wages than 
staying in the rural areas. 
 
 Rural-urban migration does not only help migrants to achieve better life in the new urban 
areas, but also helps their family members who never leave rural areas. Research documents not 
only how rural communities benefit from remittances paid by family members but also: how 
rural community projects often rely on remittances from rural-urban migrants (e.g. Ajaero, 2013; 
Miraftab, 2016); how remittance income helps retains rural school enrolment (Edwards, 2003); 
and how remittances increase family savings (Osili, 2007), housing investments (Osili, 2004), 
and small firm capital (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2007). 
 
 Rapid urbanization of prime cities, however, could lead to congestion problems. Using 
demographic data from industrial Europe and some developing countries, Jedwab et al (2015) 
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demonstrated that the historic increase in concentration of urban population in the 19th and 20th 
century was not only driven by challenges in rural areas or opportunities in urban areas. Rather, 
it was driven by the rapid decrease in urban mortality. Combined effects of this demographic 
shift, agricultural modernization, rural poverty, and urban-centered industrialization generates 
unprecedented urban population growth which led to urban congestion. 
 
 Some researchers have suggested that the answer to urban congestion problems is the 
development of areas outside the primate cities (e.g. Christiaensen & Todo, 2009; Christiaensen 
et al, 2013). Research on this area confirmed that rural urban transformation that occurs through 
the diversification of rural economic sectors demonstrates more inclusive growth patterns 
compared to the transformation that occurs as the agglomeration in mega-cities. In fact, 
population growth in mega-cities is rather poverty-increasing rather than poverty-reducing (Imai 
et al, 2014). Migration out of agriculture, not migration out of rural areas, is the “missing 
middle” that is more closely associated to poverty reduction. They suggested that the focus of 
public investment should be on developing rural non-farm economies and secondary towns 
rather than concentrated in large cities. 
 
 The suggestion that developing economies promote growth in secondary towns is in line 
with the numerous research confirming that off-farm income sources can be a crucial support to 
people living in peri-urban areas. In developing countries such as Mexico, off-farm activities can 
contribute to up to half of the total farm household’s income, which helps to reduce poverty and 
reduce income inequality (Janvry & Sadoulet, 2001). Rural households can diversify their 
income sources through production of non-grain commodities within the farm, local off farm 
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activities, and migration, dependent on their land availability and asset positions (Démurger, 
Fournier, & Yang, 2010). The opportunity to diversify rural household incomes, however, is very 
dependent on levels of education, especially of the household head (Yúnez-Naude & Taylor, 
2001), access to credits and public assets such as roads (Escobal, 2001). 
 
2.3.3 Current Gap in the Literature on Economic Impact of Urbanization 
 
 Each and every model discussed above has put much emphasis on rural urban 
transformation that is driven by either labor or population movement. The phenomenon of 
urbanization has been widely discussed in the existing development economics and economic 
geography literature as the increasing concentration of the urban population. “Cities” and 
“hinterland” have been modeled as relatively static geographic objects, not experiencing much 
changes in boundaries, shapes or spatial configuration. 
 
The existing models, therefore, do not help us much to understand rural-urban 
transformations that happen through induced spatial and geographic changes in the rural regions. 
Many models predict the economic benefits of migrating to urban areas for rural residents. 
Additionally, numerous research documents the process of land expropriation, the development 
of exurban spaces, and their consequential land-based rural economic conflicts (e.g. Guo, 2001; 
Zuhui & Hui, 2002; Swindell & Mamman, 1990; Sargeson, 2013). However, there is no single 
model or theory that can satisfactorily predict the economic outcome for people who stay where 
they live while the physical geography of the place is becoming more urban. 
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It is urgent to fill such theoretical gap in the literature and empirical research for two 
main reasons: First of all, as many geographers have well documented, the spatial configuration 
of 21st century urbanization is rather different. Relaxed, neoliberal regulatory land use policy 
often allows rural land use conversion (and the transfers of property ownership) in a sporadic, 
piece-meal fashion. The result is not contiguous urban land use, but rather many spots of urban 
land uses interspersed with rural land uses. McGee (1991) coined the term desakota, a neologism 
from the Indonesian words desa (village) and kota (city) to represent the functional ambiguity of 
such spaces. While having a substantial proportion of agricultural function, continual growth of 
nearby larger urban centers and improvements of transportation disperses some economic 
activities to desakota. Most of these activities are dispersed because they are labor and land 
intensive. 
 
Second, the 21st century national and transnational capitalists are driven to go directly to 
rural areas to capture cheap factor resources of land and labor instead of investing in established 
urban areas. The landscape of desakota thus intersperses between agriculture and small shops, 
warehouses, or factories. Some authors called this phenomenon as “rural urbanization” 
(Taubmann, 1993) or “rural agglomeration” (Marton, 2002). This leads to the sporadic 
agricultural land conversion to urban uses in spaces beyond the city border, often called the 
process of “peri-urbanization” (e.g. Lin, 2001; Cai & Sit, 2003; Firman, 2001; Zhao et al., 2009; 
Winarso, 2010). The combined effect of relaxed regulatory policy over farm land conversion and 
the increase of direct transnational capital involvement in rural development may lead to 
significant displacement for rural residents from productive farm lands. 
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2.4. MECHANISMS 
 
2.4.1 Brief Classification of Rural Farmers 
 
To determine the impact of urbanization on agricultural livelihood, it is important to 
discuss how land is used by different subgroups of rural agricultural households. There are two 
distinctions to consider: Not all rural people have land, and not all people who have land are 
directly involved in agricultural production. While many rural households have land for farming 
purposes, the reality is that many landowning rural households rent out their lands to other 
farmers who do not have land. Some peasant farmers would simply pay a rent for their right to 
cultivate in a planting period, while others would cultivate the land and share the harvest with the 
land owners. Most large landowning households cultivate their own land. They only rent part of 
the land when there is not enough family members to work on it. 
 
There is a second class of farmers who do not have much land to cultivate or do not have 
land at all, but have landholdings through renting, sharecropping or some forms of socially 
acceptable occupation of public or community land. In Indonesian villages, farming land is not 
only supplied by landowning households. In some regions, the village administration (desa) 
owns bengkok (community trust) lands that can be rented to landless farmers at a significantly 
low price. Some public and community land are rented for as low as IDR 100,000 (USD 7.17) 
per 1,000 square meters per year, with the average small-scale farmers cultivating one half of a 
hectare (around 5,000 m2). For those who do not have the financial resources to rent land, the 
only mean to have landholding is to cultivate on unoccupied land, sometimes illegally, for 
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farming purposes. In reality, however, there is no practical difference between landowners and 
landholders because most rural villagers who have land do not have a proper documentation of 
their land ownership certificate. 
 
A third category exists, where a rural household does not have land and does not have 
access to a rented, sharecropped or bengkok land, but is mostly dependent on farming work. 
These peasant households typically work as farm labors (buruh tani), and to some Indonesians 
they are not even categorized as “real” farmers (petani). If they wish to do agricultural 
production, they must rely on work provided by either a landowning or a land-
renting/sharecropper farmer. 
 
All landholders take the season’s agricultural profit as an income, but landowning and 
renter/occupier farmers receive their income from different sources. In most Indonesian rural 
areas, the land-owners’ share is around 50 percent of the season’s harvest. Therefore, renting 
farmers reap at most half of the season’s agricultural profit as their income. Meanwhile, 
landowning households can appropriate their crop share as a capital income. If they have family 
members working on un-rented land, they will also receive additional income from that 
particular plot’s agricultural profit, without having to share them with a renter farmer. 
 
Peasant farm labors will not receive any crop share. Instead, they rely on daily or weekly 
wages from work provided by landholders, either the cultivating landowners themselves or renter 
farmers. Peasant farmers only receive labor income, and they cannot appropriate agricultural 
profits from the season’s harvest. 
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These differences in the use of land also create distinctions in the temporal dimension of 
rural agricultural work. Peasant farmers mainly do manual labor in the field. While they are 
commonly the poorest among the rural poor, time-wise they are less reliant on agricultural work. 
They will be involved in agricultural production during certain periods: land preparation, seed 
planting, and harvesting seasons. Because these jobs are not available throughout the year, some 
of them should do precarious work as construction workers around the village or neighboring 
cities to supplement their income in other months. Meanwhile, both landowning and renter 
farmer households maintain a relatively stable tenure of their agricultural work because they 
have landholdings. Some of them raise livestock, but it is not likely that they do construction 
work or other jobs to supplement their income. 
 
The urbanization of rural land changes both the allocation of land resources and the 
distribution of rights over land. Much of the rural land is used for agricultural purposes but as a 
region urbanize some portion of the rural land will be reallocated for non-agricultural uses. 
Simultaneously, as more land is needed to accommodate non-agricultural uses, there will be an 
increased number of land rights transfers. The two related, but distinct processes are discussed 
below. 
 
2.4.2. Urbanization of Rural Areas and Land Use Changes 
 
There are two possible ways that the urbanization of rural agricultural land can affect 
farming households: through voluntary and involuntary changes of land use. The increased 
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demand for housing from nearby urban areas may persuade rural farming households to build 
rental buildings and rooms for rural-urban commuters. This voluntary action may reduce the area 
of that household’s land that can be used for cultivation purposes. 
 
Voluntary land use change is made possible by the fact that in the predominantly rural 
region, there is a substantial lack of state authority when it comes to the planning and regulation 
of land use. However, such voluntary change only happens to very select farming households 
with abundant wealth. Turning farm land into rental properties requires capital investment to 
cover construction expenses, utility installations and, in some cases, permit costs as well. 
 
Land use change can occur involuntarily when the local administration creates a zoning 
change. In this case, the predominantly agricultural region is planned and encouraged to 
accommodate more residential, commercial or industrial complexes. When an area experiences a 
change of zoning, farming or any other existing use of that land is not automatically condemned. 
However, existing uses that are non-compliant to the new zoning will be greatly discouraged. 
 
Cultivation can be discouraged by not planning any new construction or maintenance of 
existing irrigation services to an area that is zoned as non-agriculture. In many cases, however, 
land use change happens simply because a zoning change allows for the commercialization of 
land beyond farm-renting and sharecropping. Zoning change gives landowners the option to sell 
their land to developers for non-farming development.  
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Inevitably, urbanization will change the local allocation of land resources. As a region 
urbanize, more land will be required for development of urban uses such as public infrastructure, 
residential, commercial, and manufacturing industries. The amount of land is constant but the 
absolute number of people working in agriculture does not decrease very significantly over time. 
Therefore some farmers will have to leave agriculture because land becomes unavailable for 
their farming purposes. People who do not have other work opportunities have to either cultivate 
smaller parcels of land or work as a farm labor for farmers who have landholdings through 
renting or sharecropping. 
 
2.4.3 Land Rights Transfers and Landholding Loss 
 
While allocation of land resources is an important factor to consider at the regional level, 
land right transfers matter more at the household level. For rural farming households, land use 
changes in the rural region does not affect their livelihood until it directly affects the land parcel 
they work on. 
 
Land rights transfer can occur through direct private-to-private agreement, private-to-
private agreement with public mediation, or a direct public-to-private agreement. In private-to-
private agreement developers can acquire land through land purchases or long-time renting. In 
both cases, private entities approach rural landowners to transfer developments rights of their 
land directly to the developers. However, in most cases developers need large, contiguous area of 
land parcel which makes them have to deal with numerous land owners with divergent interests 
over land and development. In these cases, the local/municipal government often step in, playing 
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an active mediation role. There is a full range of mediation practices: One extreme example is 
where the government simply exercise its eminent domain to take over private lands and transfer 
them to private developers. The other extreme is where the local government only provides a 
forum for the negotiation between the private developers and the local collective of rural 
landowners. 
 
One land transfer mechanism that is increasingly common is where the local government 
directly enters into an agreement with private developers to utilize public lands. The Indonesian 
government is not allowed to grant property ownership of public land to private parties. 
Therefore the most common way to grant development rights over publicly owned land to 
private developers is through land swap—an indirect purchase of public land through exchange 
of land with similar market values. 
 
Public farm land swap can create a displacement of some farmers from public farming 
land, although the amount of land allocated for farming in the region does not change after the 
land swap. This effect comes from a spatial mismatch that often happens after a land swap. 
Farming households tends to live strategically close to the land that they cultivate because they 
need to walk there on a daily basis. Even if the public farm land is exchanged with another land 
with the same quality, the dislocation of that land parcel will change its relative distance from 
farming homes. Moving a house can be very costly for rural households. Therefore once a public 
farm land parcel is swapped with another land at a distant location, it will be cost prohibitive for 
landless households to farm in publicly provided land. 
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2.4.4 Social and Economic Implications of Landholding Loss 
 
Public farm land swap creates an involuntary class change for the rural agricultural 
population. Previously, public and community provision of farm land allows landless farmers to 
have cheap access to cultivable land. With such a low rent, public and community farm land 
provision allows landless farmers to earn agricultural profit which is comparable to those of 
landowning farmers. The event of public/communal land swap forces landless farmers into either 
land-renting farmers or farm labors to continue working on agriculture. 
 
However, there is very little probability of a landholding farmer turning into land-renters 
for the following reasons. First, there is constant amount of cultivable land for an increasing 
number of farmers. While the share of Indonesia’s agricultural population decreases, the absolute 
number of people and households working in agriculture increase over time. On the other hand, 
there has been very little addition to farming land by the opening of forest lands, with the 
exception of forest openings for large scale palm oil production in Sumatera. In most cases as the 
population grows and more land is allocated for non-agricultural uses, the amount of farming 
land decreases over time. 
 
Second, farm land-renting and sharecropping is not an open market. Although land-
renting contracts are renewed every year, the relationship between land owners and renters 
extends beyond the contracting periods. Both land owners and renters need to eliminate future 
uncertainty in terms of who will work on the land so that it will stay productive. It is a very 
common practice for the land owners to make a “promise” to rent the land to the same renter the 
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next year. Some renters and owners are even related by kinship. Therefore land is not simply 
rented to the highest bidder, and not every farmer can rent a land. 
 
For the two reasons above, a farmer losing landholding will have to work in agriculture 
as a farm labor, or quit farming all at once. Rural farming jobs are typically the ones with the 
lowest skill sets required. Therefore the probability of a farmer quitting agriculture and finding 
another employment with a higher degree of skill and education requirement is very slim. When 
a farmer loses landholding, staying in agriculture by working as a farm labor is an inevitable 
option to maintain family-supporting livelihood. 
 
2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In this research I evaluate whether farmers’ loss of access to farm lands negatively affect 
their livelihood in rapidly urbanizing rural areas. To operationalize that research purpose, I 
evaluate the relationships between different causal events and their outcome livelihood changes. 
The main events at interest here are the loss of farm landholdings, urbanization, and the loss of 
landholdings under the circumstance of urbanization. The impact of landholding loss and 
urbanization on household livelihood change will be determined independently from each other 
before they are tested as a simultaneous event. The outcome at interest is livelihood change, 
mainly operationalized by evaluating changes on farming household income and consumption 
before and after the occurrence of each of the above. 
Specifically, in this research I test whether the following hypotheses are true: 
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1. Farming households who lost their landholding have worse income & consumption 
change over time compared to farming households who maintain their landholdings 
2. Farming households in urbanizing regions have worse income & consumption change 
over time compared to farming households in relatively unchanging regions 
3. If evaluated jointly, losing landholdings in an urbanizing regions predict worse 
income and consumption change for farming households compared to all other 
farming households in a similar regional and household situation. 
 
2.6. METHODOLOGY 
 
2.6.1 Data 
 
This research uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey (Sakerti) wave 3 (year 2000) and 4 
(year 2007). Sakerti is an on-going longitudinal survey which was first conducted in 1993 and 
repeated in 1997, 2000, 2007, and 2016. The sample covers about 83 percent of the Indonesian 
population (around 191 million out of 231 million Indonesians) who live in 13 most populous 
provinces in the country. Most of Sakerti’s covered provinces are in the islands of Java, 
Sumatera, and Bali, with the addition of South Kalimantan (Borneo) and South Sulawesi 
(Celebes). As many as 10,255 and 12,955 households were surveyed in 2000 and 2007, 
respectively. However, some families surveyed in 2000 could not be found for re-surveying 
purpose in 2007, reducing the sample size to 8,785 households if it is treated as a time series 
instead of a cross-sectional data.  
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Sakerti reports both landholding and landownership. While landownership is reported in 
a simple binary category (owning or not owning a land), landholding is reported in a slightly 
more complicated way. Sakerti wave 3 reports three areas of landholding: (1) the total area of 
land owned by the household; (2) the total area of cultivated land, out of the total landholding, 
and; (3) the area of land that is rented/sharecropped to other households, out of the total 
cultivated land. Many households do not report the total area of their landholding but report the 
total area of their cultivated land. It is very likely that those households rent or sharecrop land for 
farming purposes. On the other hand, some households do not report either the total area of their 
cultivated land or the total area of landholdings, but report their area of rented/sharecropped land. 
These households are very likely the ones who have land but do not have a family member who 
is able or willing to do the farm work. 
 
In addition to rented and sharecropped land, Sakerti wave 4 also reports the total area of 
bengkok (community-trust land) being held by the household. This reporting is a significant 
advancement of Sakerti wave 3, which does not differentiate bengkok from sharecropped land. 
Bengkok belongs to the village and should not be transferred to individuals through sales. 
However, they can be rented for agricultural purposes. Although renters must renew their rent 
contract every season, most village land renters are repeat contractors of the same plot of the 
land. In reality, the households who rent a bengkok land can have a semi-tenured holding of the 
particular land plot. 
 
Sakerti records consumption by grouping them into food and non-food items, measures in 
kind consumption based on the type of goods, then monetizes each consumption item based on a 
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locally standardized price index. For food items, it records food from different groups: staple 
foods; vegetables; dried foods; protein sources; dairy; spices, and beverages. In addition to food 
items purchased in the market, Sakerti recognizes the non-monetary economic exchanges 
prevalent in rural societies by recording food given/received from other households. After the 
monetary crisis in 1997, Sakerti records households’ consumption of government-sponsored 
food items such as subsidized rice, protein (beef, chicken, and fish), vegetables and cooking oil. 
Non-food items are grouped into monthly expenditures (electricity, water, communication, 
household and personal items, domestic services, recreation, and transportation) and annual 
expenditures (clothing, household supplies, medical costs, and taxes). It also records common 
“social” expenses such as arisan (a social gathering with a group saving involved) and ritual 
ceremonies. 
 
Income is reported based on two big groups of income source: farming and non-farming, 
recognizing that one household can have more than one type of work and more than one person 
as a source of income. Aside of farmland, Sakerti records different types of farming assets 
including hard stem plants, farm buildings, livestock/poultry/fish pond, farming vehicles, 
tractors, heavy equipment and small tools. Farming revenues, expenses, and profits are recorded 
separately from capital income received from the rental of those farm-related assets. In 2007, the 
farming expenditure section details the type of crops grown within different seasons. Non-
farming income uses very similar approach. Sakerti also records non-labor income sources such 
as scholarship, insurance money, lottery winnings, and government cash transfers, in addition to 
non-income type of household financing such as debt and borrowings. 
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2.6.2 Trends 
 
In general, households who live in changing regions experienced more pressures to 
agricultural livelihood. Table # demonstrates that in urbanizing regions between 2000 and 2007 
there were fewer households staying in agriculture and more households leaving farming to work 
in any other type of economic activity. Only one in five households in urbanizing regions could 
be found doing farming in both 2000 and 2007, compared to one in three households in 
unchanging regions. In a similar trend, one in nine households in urbanizing regions left 
agriculture, while only one in ten households did so in 2007. This reduction to the number of 
households in agriculture was slightly counterbalanced by the relatively similar proportion of 
households joining agricultural work in 2007. Ultimately, in urbanizing regions there was a 
higher proportion of households who end up not being in agriculture, compared to their peers in 
the unchanging regions (see table 1). 
 
Table 2.1 Changes in Economic Activity in the Full Sample, 2000 & 2007 
Changes in Economic 
Activity 
Urbanizing 
Region 
Non-
Urbanizing Total 
# % # %   
       
Stay Farming 162 22.1 2,480 30.8 2,642 
 Decreased Landholdings 138 18.8 1,891 23.5 2,029 
 No Change in Landholdings 8 1.1 237 2.9 245 
 Increased Landholdings 16 2.2 352 4.4 368 
Quit Farming 85 11.6 783 9.7 868 
Enter Farming 70 9.5 666 8.3 736 
Not Farming 416 56.8 4,122 51.2 4,538 
       
Total 733 100 8,051 100 8,784 
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However, the most important trend to evaluate is the prevalence of households 
experiencing a decrease in the size of their landholdings. In both urbanizing and unchanging 
regions, most households who stayed in farming had access to much smaller cultivation land in 
2007 compared to what they had in 2000. To illustrate, as many as one in five households had 
smaller landholdings while only one in thirty households have the same or larger land in any 
urbanizing region in 2007. That means that eight out of ten households who stayed in farming in 
urbanizing regions had smaller land in 2007 compared to their land in 2000. For comparison, 
only seven out of ten households experienced a decrease in landholdings in unchanging regions. 
 
2.6.3 Identification Strategy 
 
One of the main challenge of answering each of the research questions is to consider the 
possibility that the groups of farmers compared are characteristically different from one another. 
For example, it is possible that the group of farming households who lost landholdings had been 
marginally poor compared to other farming households to begin with. If they have smaller 
wealth, savings, or asset, it is likely that they can only rent small amount of land to cultivate, 
leading to a smaller income regardless of their tenure on land. 
 
If this is the case, livelihood comparisons drawn after the event of landholding loss will 
be meaningless. It is very likely that such comparison will show that the land-losing group have 
inferior income and consumption compared to their land-maintaining group. However, it is 
difficult to determine how much of that lower income and consumption level is associated with 
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the event of losing landholding, and how much of the discrepancy actually represents their 
difference in capacity to generate income in general. 
 
The solution to this challenge is to use the double difference (DD) research design to 
answer the first question. Instead of comparing income/consumption between land-losing and 
land-maintaining groups after the event of land-loss, I compare the trajectories of their 
income/consumption change over time. Assuming that it is very unlikely that poor households 
become suddenly rich over a short period of time, even if the two groups have very different 
initial income/consumption levels, the rate of change for their income/consumption should be 
somewhat similar. If the two groups do not demonstrate parallel trajectories in either their 
income or consumption change, the difference between the two changes (essentially the 
difference-in-difference) can be used to determine the real impact of the event of landholding 
loss (see figure 2.1 below for illustration). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Difference-in-difference research design 
 
A similar challenge—the characteristic difference between two farmer groups—may 
occur to households in different locations. Farmers in urbanizing regions face different market 
conditions compared to their peers in rural areas that are untouched by urbanization. Regions that 
are urbanizing are most likely located very close to existing urbanized areas. Farmers in areas 
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closer to the city do not have to bear the high transportation cost to bring their produce to the 
market so that they can sell their product without the help of a middleman. Even if two farming 
households produce the same amount of harvest in each year, such locational advantage benefit 
farmers who are closer to the city so that they may have significantly higher initial 
income/consumption level. 
 
Therefore, DD research design can also be used to answer the second question. In this 
case, I evaluate the difference between income/consumption change of farmers in urbanizing 
region and those in relatively unchanging regions. The double difference is used to determine the 
impact of urbanization on farming household’s livelihood. 
 
The third research question requires a more rigorous research design, given the 
complexity of its operationalization. Essentially, the question aims at determining the impact of 
urbanization on farming households’ livelihood, but only through the mechanism of land use 
change that create involuntary landholding loss. 
 
My approach to this inquiry is to conceptualize the event of landholding loss as a 
physical disposition of a certain propensity to lose land, driven by some regional and household 
factors. Consider a farming household with the following characteristics: large number of 
dependent in family members, are female headed, have a household head with low education 
attainment, only have very small land to cultivate and few tools to help cultivation effort, live in 
infertile area of the country without the opportunity to migrate, and maintain work in agriculture 
in a region that is slowly changing into a more urban environment. Such household is more 
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likely to experience financial hurdles. During the difficult times, those households are the ones 
more likely to sell their land, if they have any, or lose the opportunity to rent land for next 
year/season’s cultivation period for the lack of income savings.  
 
Reversing the logic, all of the characteristics above—size, household head’s gender and 
education, the amount of cultivable land owned/held, the total amount of farming assets, 
migration opportunity, and some dummy variables representing regional characteristics—can be 
used to estimate each farming household’s propensity to lose their landholdings. Each of the 
household in the sample can then be assigned a score, which represents their propensity to lose 
land. 
 
The third question can then be answered using a combination of a DD and a propensity 
score matching (PSM) research design. Each farming household is not aggregated to two 
comparable groups. Instead, each household is compared to a set of households with very similar 
propensity scores. This method allows me to evaluate the income/consumption DD at the 
household level DD for a very particular household situation: experiencing landholding loss 
under the circumstance of urbanization (see figure 2.2 for illustration). 
 
   
Figure 2.2 Difference-in-difference with propensity score matching 
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For further robustness, PSM can be applied using four different matching methods. The 
simplest way to match a household is by finding another household with the nearest propensity 
score (nearest neighbor matching). This simple method is limited because it will only generate 
the same or less number of households as controls. More sophisticated methods include the use 
of a radius, a kernel, or a stratification for matching purpose. In those following methods, all 
households within a certain bandwidth will be included as controls for a particular household of 
interest. More explanation on matching methods can be found on Becker and Ichino (2002). 
 
To increase measures of accuracy in variance and confidence intervals, and to avoid bias, 
I perform resampling techniques using bootstrapping method. From 100 replication a hypothesis 
testing can then be performed to test statistical significance. 
 
2.6.4 Variables 
 
All variables for this research are summarized in the table 2.2 below. For the purpose of 
this research, only households with at least one family member working in agriculture both in 
2000 and 2007 are used, further reducing the sample size to 2,642. 
 
The variable “landholdings” reports whether the surveyed household 
owned/rented/sharecropped land in either 2000 or 2007. A household is considered to experience 
a “landholding loss” if it had/rented/shared a land in 2000 but not in 2007. 
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“Region type” reports the administrative designation for each region. A kelurahan is 
considered an urban sub-district while a desa is considered rural. A region is considered 
“urbanizing” if it was a desa in 2000 and became a kelurahan in 2007, or if the surveyor 
designated the area as urban despite the desa status. 
 
All income, consumption, and asset changes are calculated by subtracting the amount in 
2000 from the amount in 2007. All such monetary variables have been converted using 
consumer’s price index to be comparable to Indonesia’s national account in 2013, when the last 
CPI data was available. Some statistical outliers in income and consumption data are taken care 
by excluding all income changes more than IDR 45 million IDR (± USD 3,200).  
 
Migration opportunity reports the history of a particular household’s movements across 
region between 1997 and 2000 (between wave 2 and wave 3 of the survey. The data range from 
0 to 5, with 0 = the household did not move; 1 = the household moved within the sub-district 
(kelurahan/desa); 2 = the household moved within the district (kecamatan); 3 = the household 
moved within the county (kabupaten); 4 = the household moved within the province, and; 5 = the 
household moved to another province or abroad. Because Indonesia is an archipelago, 
movements across administrative regions sometimes involves movements across islands. Even 
when these movements happen within the island, it is relatively expensive and labor intensive for 
farming households to move to a different kabupaten or province. Therefore, while it is not a 
perfect measure, movements across administrative regions represent relative distance in cultural 
attributes and economic opportunities. 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics 
Variables N=0 N=1 N Mean SD Min Max 
        
Independent Variables        
     Landholdings 2000 (1=Yes; 0=No) 549 2,093 2,642 0.79 0.41 0 1 
     Landholdings 2007 (1=Yes; 0=No) 618 2,024 2,642 0.77 0.42 0 1 
     Region Type 2000 (1=Urban; 0=Rural) 2,347 295 2,642 0.11 0.32 0 1 
     Region Type 2007 (1=Urban; 0=Rural) 2,241 401 2,642 0.15 0.36 0 1 
        
Dependent Variables        
     Total Income Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,553 2.62 10.78 -44.84 44.90 
     Farming Income Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,606 1.67 8.15 -43.91 44.82 
     Total Consumption Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,430 3.89 13.76 -44.79 44.92 
     Food Consumption Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,582 1.52 9.74 -41.66 44.54 
     Non-food Consumption Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,516 2.92 9.85 -44.37 44.92 
        
Propensity Score Estimation Variables (2000)       
     Household Size N/A N/A 2,642 5.65 2.45 1 37 
     Female Household Head (1=Yes; 0=No) 2,384 258 2,642 0.10 0.30 0 1 
     Household Head's Year of Schooling N/A N/A 2,642 4.48 3.78 0 18 
     Area of Cultivable Land Owned/Held N/A N/A 2,079 7.09 50.46 0 800 
     Total Farming Assets N/A N/A 2,642 3.81 19.10 0 707 
     Migration Opportunity N/A N/A 2,635 0.22 0.74 0 5 
     Kecamatan Dummy Variable N/A N/A 2,642 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
        
Propensity Score Matching Variables (2000-2007)       
     Landholding Loss (1=Yes; 0=No) 2,372 270 2,642 0.10 0.30 0 1 
     Urbanizing Region (1=Yes; 0=No) 2,480 162 2,642 0.06 0.24 0 1 
     Total Farming Asset Change, 2000-2007 N/A N/A 2,642 6.80 47.80 -703 1,020 
                
Note: All income, consumption, and asset data are reported in million Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). All 
income/consumption change data >= 45 million & <= -45 million IDR are considered as outliers and not 
reported. Area of Land is reported in one hectare (10,000 square meters). SD = Standard Deviation. 
  
To ensure that the control and treatment group are as similar as possible, I conducted a 
simple T-test on the difference between the means of control and treatment groups in each 
variables. The results of those T-test are summarized below on Table 2.3. The p-values of these 
tests do not show any statistical significance on the hypothesis that the two means (control and 
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treatment groups) are statistically different. This result indicates that all of the variables that will 
be used for matching purposes to be balanced between the control and treatment groups.  
 
Table 2.3 Sample Balance for Propensity Score Matching Purpose 
Variables N 
  
Control 
  Group 
Treatment - 
Control  
 
  Mean SD   Coeff. p-value 
        
Propensity Score Estimation Variables (2000)        
     Household Size 2,642  5.65 2.45  -0.04 0.01 
     Female Household Head (1=Yes; 0=No) 2,642  0.10 0.30  -0.07 0.57 
     Household Head's Year of Schooling 2,642  4.48 3.78  -0.01 0.20 
     Area of Cultivable Land Owned/Held 2,079  7.09 50.46  0.00 0.89 
     Total Farming Assets 2,642  3.81 19.10  0.00 0.46 
     Migration Opportunity 2,635  0.22 0.74  0.12 0.01 
     Kecamatan Dummy Variable 2,642  N/A N/A  0.00 0.16 
                
 
2.7 FINDINGS 
 
2.7.1 Do land-losing farming households have worse livelihood? 
 
 The following series of figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrates why the DD approach is appropriate 
in this type of research. In 2007, land-maintaining farming households have an average 
household income of IDR 11.3 million while the land-losing households’ average income sits at 
6.6 million. There is substantially and statistically significant difference between total income of 
land-losing and land-maintaining farming household groups in 2007. However, the land-losing 
group have been historically low-incomed to be begin with. In 2000, their average income was a 
meager 5.1 million, while their land-maintaining peer households were at 8.3 million. 
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The impact of losing land on total income can be determined by creating a comparable 
control group as if both land-losing and land-maintaining household groups have the same lower 
average income of 5.1 million in 2000 (see figure 2.3.1). Projecting that income to the future 
using the land-maintaining group’s income change trajectory, that comparable control group 
would have 8.1 million in 2007. The real impact of losing land on farming households’ total 
income is the difference between 6.6 and 8.1 million. In another words, on average each farming 
household lose IDR 1.5 million (± USD 1,066) of their annual income when they lose hold on 
cultivable land. 
 
Using the same method of creating a comparable control group, the difference in farming 
income as an impact of losing land can be determined. Figure 2.3.2 shows that such impact is the 
difference between the comparable control group and the land-losing group’s farming income in 
2007, which is 5.1 and 3.5 million, respectively. That means that on average each farming 
household lose IDR 1.6 million in their annual farming income when they lose hold of a 
cultivable land. 
 
It is unnecessary to create a comparable control group to evaluate change difference in 
consumption. In all measures (food, non-food, and total consumption), there is no statistically 
significant evidence that land-losing and land-maintaining had different levels of consumption in 
2000. There is no statistically significant evidence that land-losing households eat less compared 
to their land-maintaining peer households, even after they lost landholding sometime between 
2000 and 2007 (2.3.4). However, their average total consumption (2.3.3) and non-food 
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consumption (2.3.5) substantially diverged in 2007. On average, land-losing farmer households 
consume IDR 1.7 million less in total, 1.5 million of which is a smaller non-food consumption 
compared to their land-maintaining peers. Statistical significance for each of these tests can be 
found on Appendix A. 
 
It is worth noting that T-tests on the treatment and control groups do not indicate 
statistical significance for the difference between the two means on year 1993 and 1997. Hence 
we can conclude a parallel path for control and treatment groups prior to treatment (losing land). 
 
2.7.2 Do farmers in urbanizing regions have worse livelihood? 
 
Farming households in urbanizing regions historically have enjoyed higher total income 
compared to their peers in relatively unchanging rural regions. Figure 2.4.1 shows that in 2000, 
farmers in urbanizing regions had 15.2 million in annual income while their peers in relatively 
rural regions only had 7.5 million. However, the growth of total income in urbanizing regions are 
not as fast as in relatively rural regions, at least for farming households. Projecting the trajectory 
of total income in the rural regions on a comparable control group, the average of that control’s 
total income would sit at 18.1 million annually. That is IDR 1 million more than the average total 
income of farming households in urbanizing regions. 
 
Even though they received much higher farming income in 2000, households in 
urbanizing regions experience a great shock in 2007 when their farming income falls below the 
amount that their peers in rural regions make from agricultural production (2.4.2). While a 
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comparable control group could hypothetically make 10.2 million from farming, those in 
urbanizing regions only make 3.5 million from farming in 2007. On average, urbanization can be 
associated to a whopping IDR 6.7 million flop in annual farming income. 
 
However, the value of farming households’ consumption in urbanizing regions are more 
compared to their peers in relatively unchanging regions, at least in terms of food consumption. 
On average, their total consumption is worth 27 million, compared to 24.7 million for their peers 
in rural regions in 2007 (2.4.3). The value of their food consumption was initially lower at 12.9 
million, compared to 14.1 million in the relatively unchanging regions. This account soared to 
17.8 million for households in urbanizing regions, much higher than 15.7 million in relatively 
unchanging rural areas (2.4.4). 
 
A reversing trend is actually shown by non-food consumption, in which households in 
relatively unchanging rural regions are catching up with their peers in urbanizing regions. 
Initially in 2000, households in rural regions only consumed 7.2 million of non-food 
commodities, while their peers in urbanizing regions consumed 8.9 million worth of them 
annually. In 2007, they consumed the somewhat similar amount of 10.7 million worth of non-
food commodities (2.4.5). Statistical significance for each of these tests can be found on 
Appendix B. 
 
Again, here pre-treatment T-tests do not indicate statistical significance for the difference 
between the control and treatment groups’ means. Hence we can assume that the two groups 
were not statistically different prior to losing land. 
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Figures 2.3 & 2.4 Effect of Landholding Loss (2.3) and Urbanization (2.4) on Income and 
Consumption Change for Households Staying in Agriculture, 2000 & 2007 (in million IDR) 
 
2.3.1 
 
 
 
 
2.4.1 
 
2.3.2 
 
2.4.2 
 
2.3.3 
 
2.4.3 
 
2.3.4 
 
2.4.4 
 
2.3.5 
 
2.4.5 
 
 
Note: 
  Group experiencing “treatment” (landholding loss / living in an urbanized region) 
  Group not experiencing “treatment” (control group) 
  Comparable control group for visualization purpose 
Number of observations: N (T=0) = 2,372; N (T=1) = 270. Refer to Appendix A for detailed statistics.
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2.7.3 Do land-losing farming households in urbanizing regions have worse livelihood? 
 
All four propensity score matching tests demonstrate that farming households who lost 
land under the circumstance of urbanization experience a reduction in their farming income. 
Nearest neighbor matching test indicate that on average, farming household lose IDR 2.73 
million in annual farming income when they lose land due to urbanization. Radius, kernel and 
stratification matching tests give more moderate estimates, which is IDR 1.87, 1.56, and 1.70 
million in lost annual farming income. All of these estimates are very statistically significant at 5 
percent level (see table 2.4). 
 
With the exception of radius matching, all tests finds very statistically significant 
evidence of similar results on total income. On average, losing land due to urbanization will 
cause farming households lose between IDR 1.43 and 2.86 million in total income. 
 
There is less statistical significance that land loss due to urbanization leads to a reduction 
in consumption levels, but all tests demonstrate that such reduction exists. On average, when a 
household lose land in an urbanizing region, they will consume between IDR 1.37 and 1.55 less 
than their peer households in a very similar regional and household characteristics.  
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Table 2.4 Effect of Landholding Loss under Urbanization on Income and Consumption Change for Households Staying in 
Agriculture, 2000&2007 
 
  
NN   R   K   S 
w/o BS w/ BS   w/o BS w/ BS   w/o BS w/ BS   w/o BS w/ BS 
                    
Total Income  
N (T=1/T=0) 266 / 233  264 / 1,780  266 / 1,788  266 / 1,788 
ATT -2.86 *** -2.86 *  -1.40  -1.40   -1.48 N/A -1.44 ***  -1.43 *** -1.43 *** 
Standard 
Error (1.60)  (1.64)   (1.79)  (1.70)   N/A  (0.68)   (0.59)  (0.57)  
                  
Farming Income  
N (T=1/T=0) 266 / 235  264 / 1,780  266 / 1,788  266 / 1,788 
ATT -2.73 *** -2.73 ***  -1.87 *** -1.87 ***  -1.56 N/A -1.56 ***  -1.70 *** -1.70 *** 
Standard 
Error (0.76)  (1.55)   (0.74)  (0.61)   N/A  (0.77)   (0.68)  (0.62)  
                    
Total Consumption 
N (T=1/T=0) 249 / 221  247 / 1,684  249 / 1,691  249 / 1,691 
ATT -0.52  -0.52   -1.55 ** -1.55 **  -1.48 N/A -1.48 **  -1.37 * -1.37 * 
Standard 
Error (1.71)  (2.02)   (1.16)  (1.05)   N/A  (1.17)   (1.14)  (1.15)  
                                        
Matching Methods: NN=Nearest Neighbor; R=Radius (bandwidth 0.005); K=Kernel; S=Stratification. BS=Boot Strap with 100 replications. 
N=Number of Observations. T=1 is the group of farmers who experience landholding loss; T= 0 is the control group. ATT = Average Treatment on the 
treated, in this case treatment is defined as landholding loss. All values are reported in IDR 1 million (USD 73). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the average treatment effect estimates. Statistical significances are noted by: * < 15%; ** < 10%; * **< 5%. ATT with Kernel 
matching does not produce a standard error estimate, hence no statistical significance recorded.  
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2.8 TESTING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE STORY 
 
 The following exercise uses the sample of all households who work in agriculture in 2000 
instead of only households who work in agriculture in both 2000 and 2007. This exercise takes 
into account the possibility that some farming households leaves the agriculture sector (instead 
of maintaining farm-based work) once they lose land. Failing to consider this possibility can 
result in over or under-estimation of the impacts of losing landholdings. If the household quit 
agricultural work because they can no longer afford the land rent or no longer have access to 
public land, then the estimates will be lower than the actual impact. On the contrary, if the 
household leave agriculture because they find better opportunities outside agriculture, then the 
estimates produced by considering only those who stays in agriculture will overestimate the 
impact of losing land. 
 
 The following T-test results in table 2.5 indicate that households who lose land and 
maintaining land have statistically different total and farming incomes in both 2000 and 2007. 
On average, households who has a family member working in agriculture in 2000 and lose land 
in 2007 receives 3.09 million IDR less in total income and 3.84 million IDR less in farm income 
in 2007, compared to their peers who do not lose land. These findings are statistically significant 
at 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. In year 2000, those households above-mentioned receives 
1.43 million IDR less in total income and .98 million IDR less in farm income, a finding which 
are both statistically significant at 10 percent level. 
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 It is worth noting that the total income difference between the two groups (households 
who lose and maintain land) is consistently smaller than the farm income difference in both 
periods. What it signals is that the households who lose land have smaller farm income than 
those who maintain land. However, those who lose land seem to have other income sources. 
Unfortunately, the amount of all alternative income sources for land-losing households does not 
exceed the reduction of their farming income, which results in lower total income in general.  
 
Table 2.5 Effect of Landholding Loss on Total and Farming Income Change for Households 
Working in Agriculture in Year 2000. 
 
Variables 
  Mean 
 (Std. Error) 
  
Losing 
Land 
Maintaining 
Land Difference 
      
Total Income 2007  3.93 7.02 -3.09 ** 
  2.16 0.71 1.81  
Farm Income 2007  1.43 5.27 -3.84 *** 
  0.17 0.19 0.41  
      
Total Income 2000  5.24 6.67 -1.43 * 
  0.72 0.53 1.17  
Farm Income 2000  3.69 4.67 -0.98 * 
  0.68 0.34 0.79  
      
D/D Total Income  -1.31 0.35 -1.66  
  2.28 0.88 2.13  
D/D Farm Income  -2.26 0.61 -2.87 *** 
  0.69 0.38 0.85  
            
Note: N = 2855 households maintaining land, 655 households losing 
land. Statistical significance: *=<10%; **=< 5%; ***=<1%. D/D = 
Difference-in-Difference. 
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The difference-in-difference (DD) estimate can be used to estimate the impact of losing 
land to total and farm incomes for the land-losing household group. It is worth noting that 
statistical significance can only be found for the DD estimate for farming income and not for 
total income. On average, land-losing households receive 2.87 million IDR less of farming 
income, compared to their land-maintaining peer households, a finding which is statistically 
significant at 1 percent level. 
 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
2.9.1 Lessons learned 
 
There are three important takeaways from the previous findings in this research. First, 
this study provides a strong evidence that securing landholding can help maintaining farming 
households’ income and consumption, while taking away land will unequivocally create a 
livelihood shock for affected farming households. There is a remarkable similarity between the 
estimates of loss in annual total income (IDR 1.5 million) and farming income (IDR 1.6 million) 
for households losing landholding during the survey period. That finding suggests that most 
households who maintain work in agriculture could not find alternative income sources to 
weather an income shock that is caused by losing landholding. 
 
More importantly is what that income reduction means to the quality of life. There is 
another remarkable similarity between the loss amount of annual income and the loss in 
consumption (IDR 1.7 million). Almost all of those loss are experienced through a reduction in 
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non-food consumption. What that generally means is that when a farming household loses 
income from losing their landholdings, they would do one of the following: not having money to 
buy enough clothing and personal expenditures, stop sending their children to school, not buying 
electricity and clean water, or not seeing the medical doctor when they are ill. 
 
Second, it provides evidence of an economic pressure for people who choose to remain 
working in agriculture when their surrounding environment is becoming more urbanized. It is 
true that the total income of farming households in urbanizing regions are not falling like their 
income from agriculture. However, the growth of their total income is smaller than the one 
enjoyed by their peers in relatively unchanging rural regions. This finding suggests that even if 
urban farmers are able to find alternative income sources, the amount made from those other 
incomes will not sufficiently cover the loss of income from agriculture.  
 
There are some explanations to why such economic pressure during the time of 
urbanization is not demonstrated in the data for consumption. First of all, Indonesian consumer 
price index (CPI) is calculated based on a survey of commodity prices conducted in the largest 
city of each province. Consequently, CPI can show the level of affordability in different 
provinces in Indonesia. However, it does not reflect price differences between urban and rural 
regions within each provinces. Despite consuming less (monetary) value of food, people in rural 
regions actually face cheaper prices for most food commodities. If this price difference is taken 
into account, it is very likely that the difference of food consumed by people in urbanizing areas 
and unchanging rural regions would disappear. 
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Third, and most importantly, the negative effects of urbanization, such as income loss 
experienced by farming households, occur through some forms of loss in rights to use land for 
cultivation purposes. This finding supports a reasonable assumption that urbanization leads to 
some levels of land use changes that are hostile to agricultural households.  
 
2.9.2 Limitations of This Research 
 
This research has three main limitations: First, it treats the household as a unified 
decision-making entity, thus is limited in its understanding of intergenerational change and intra-
household dynamics. It uncovers the many aspects of livelihood impacts on households who 
members stay in agriculture. However, this research does not inform readers on what happens to 
the household whose first generation stays in agriculture but their children works in another 
sectors of the economy. Second, this research is limited in its ability to inform readers about 
occupational choices which extends beyond the categories of staying in and moving out of 
agriculture. There is a complex array of possibilities of people working in other sectors without 
entirely leaving agriculture. Some people complement their agricultural incomes with other non-
farm sources, such as working as seasonal construction labor. These occupational choices are 
related to changes in preference and other economic motives, such as cross-sectoral differences 
in wages and income potentials, which is not discussed in great detail in this research. Third, this 
research does not directly measure the impact of macroeconomic shocks on household income 
and consumption. 
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2.9.3 Future Research Recommendation 
 
This research is designed to focus on the livelihood impact of landholding loss and 
urbanization for farmers who maintain work in agriculture. There are some questions that this 
study is not designed to answer. The most important question, among others, is whether 
urbanization leads to a better or worse livelihood outcome for those who move out from 
agriculture to another sector of the economy. Future research should focus on answering this 
question by exercising more rigorous data disaggregation and income/consumption tracking to 
the level of individuals instead of households. 
 
On the other hand, there are some questions that available data simply cannot respond to 
the research design requirement. First is the operationalization of urbanization as a land use 
change concept. There are few data available on land use, which makes a study of land use 
change on such a large region such as at the national level impossible. Future research should be 
conducted at either county or city level, where land use data is available in finer resolution. 
Second, future research can also focus on determining the different impacts of urbanization on 
different types of landholders: land-owning, land-renters, sharecroppers and people who are 
dependent on public or community land. Those two objectives are simply impossible to be 
conducted at a national level. Therefore future research should focus on case studies with smaller 
sites of observation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
URBANIZATION RATE, CLUSTERING OF URBAN GROWTH AND POVERTY IN 
SALATIGA, CENTRAL JAVA, INDONESIA 
 
3.1 ABSTRACT 
 
In this research, I tested the hypothesis that in the short term, rapid and more clustered 
urbanization of rural areas predicts the incidence of poverty. Using enhanced vegetation index 
(EVI), I classified land satellite imageries to evaluate land-cover changes in Salatiga, Indonesia 
and visualize the rural urbanization process. Two quantitative metrics were generated from this 
qualitative evaluation: the urbanization rate and the clustering rate. Urbanization rate measured 
the amount of land cover change from farmlands to urban uses, taking into account that there 
were also new farmlands opened during the period of the study. Clustering rate, on the other 
hand, measured the distribution of such land-cover changes over space. The research found that 
urbanization rate was not correlated to new poverty incidence, but the clustering rate was very 
positively correlated to it. This result was consistent across two alternative regression models 
employed in the study. This research provided an empirical support to spatial policies with a 
social policy insight: protection of farmlands during rapid rural urbanization, protection of 
farming jobs and public/communitarian access to farming lands, and selective implementation to 
land use changes by major developers. 
 
Keywords: poverty, agriculture, clustering, rural, urbanization 
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3.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Do rural areas with higher rates of land-cover change have significantly higher risk of 
new poverty? How can we predict new poverty incidences by evaluating the trend in physical 
environmental changes in rural areas? This research studies how the geographic information on 
newly poor households can provide a better inference about where they fall into poverty. It 
evaluates whether rural urbanization—a transformation of a rural environment in a rapid and 
clustered fashion—actually expose rural population into a higher risk of falling into poverty. 
 
This research attempts to answer those questions using data from Salatiga, a small city 
within the Regency of Semarang, Cenral Java, Indonesia. Salatiga is a desakota area that is 
physically detached, but economically integrated to the larger regional urban area of Semarang 
City. For the past decade, rapid economic growth of the region has been followed by substantial 
changes in the city’s physical environment. Some parts of Salatiga have completely changed into 
substantially more urban areas while some other parts maintain its desakota characteristics. 
Locals have expressed concerns regarding how the rapid urbanization in Salatiga create pressures 
to local agricultural livelihoods through destruction of prime agricultural lands. Landless rural 
agricultural workers have been disproportionately disadvantaged by such rapid rural urbanization 
because public and community lands where they used to cultivate have been mostly converted 
into built areas. As one of the most direct evidence of an economic pressure, some of Salatiga’s 
most rapidly urbanizing rural kelurahans (sub-districts) have maintained consistently higher 
poverty incidences than the provincial and national account, despite their positive accounts on 
aggregate regional income measures. 
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3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
During the last three decades, geographers have identified and catalogued many forms of 
urban development of the 20th and 21st century. A substantial proportion of these new theories 
come from fruitful observations of the recently developed economies in the Global South, East 
Asia and Southeast Asia. The new paradigm addresses the lack of theorization of urbanization 
that emerges from the margins of the core cities (Guldin, 1996), where major transformational 
challenges are located at in many Asian countries (Rimmer, 2002; McGee et al., 2007, McGee 
2008).1 
 
McGee (1991) coins the term desakota, a neologism from the Indonesian words desa 
(village) and kota (city) to represent the functional ambiguity of such spaces. While having a 
substantial proportion of agricultural function, continual growth of nearby larger urban centers 
and improvements of transportation disperses some economic activities to desakota. Most of 
these activities are dispersed because they are labor and land intensive. There are instances 
where national and transnational capitalists are more interested to go directly to rural areas to 
capture cheap factor resources of land and labor instead of investing in established urban areas. 
The landscape of desakota thus intersperses between agriculture and small shops, warehouses, or 
                                                          
1 Dick and Rimmer (1997) disputed this notion of uniqueness and accused area specialists of essential-izing Asian 
and Third World cities. They suggest that the early phase of de-colonization is a transitional phase and that in the 
latter phase Asian cities are far more similar to Western cities. Shatkin (2007) indirectly rebutted this accusation by 
pointing out that urban studies need to recognize the negotiated interaction between global forces and local agency. 
The emerging perspectives on cities in the Global South are unique because of their particular understanding of local 
institutional settings, not just their urban fabric. 
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factories. Some authors called this phenomenon as “rural urbanization” (Taubmann, 1993) or 
“rural agglomeration” (Marton, 2002). 
 
There are three inter-related but distinct processes happening within these kinds of 
transitional spaces: physical, economic, and political processes. The first process has something 
to do with the physical change of the rural landscapes as the consequence of the horizontal 
expansion of urban areas. Many scholars have documented the sporadic agricultural land 
conversion to urban uses in spaces beyond the city border, often called the process of “peri-
urbanization” (e.g. Lin, 2001; Cai & Sit, 2003; Firman, 2001; Zhao et al., 2009; Winarso, 2010). 
The second process is the more structural transformation of the desakota’s economy as a result 
of the increasing influence of exogenous factors. The increasingly relaxed national policy to 
accommodate foreign direct investments (FDI) makes urbanization of rural spaces much more 
externally-driven. This process makes previously rural spaces much more integrated into 
transnational economic institutions and conditions. Sit and Yang (1997) call this process “exo-
urbanization”. The third process deals with the changing borders of urban and rural spaces. The 
“lawlessness” of industrialization in transitional spaces often demands the presence of new 
institutions to govern the urbanization process. Thus peri-urbanization of rural spaces does not 
only change their physical borders but is often followed by the redefinition of its political 
borders as well. Peri-urbanization often reconfigures the relations among state, society, and 
capital. Leaf (2008) calls this process as (re)-territorialization. 
 
Up to date, there is no single research which investigates the connection between new 
poverty and urbanization as a physical process involving land-related changes. Most researches 
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in this topic define urbanization as a people-oriented process, that is, the proportional increase of 
the urban population in comparison to the rural counterpart (e.g. Calì & Menon, 2013; Shahbaz, 
Aamir, & Shabbir, 2010; Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula, 2007). 
 
Despite the proliferation of research on this topic, in the literature there is very little 
interest to draw the connection between this less conventional, rural-based form of urbanization 
with the welfare dynamics of the rural people. Arguably, it needs to be the priority of any future 
work in economic geography because rural livelihoods typically are more dependent on the 
physical environment in comparison to urban livelihoods. Significant changes in the rural 
environment, such as conversions of farmland into residential, commercial, or industrial uses 
will greatly affect the rural agricultural community by physically limiting some people from 
agricultural production activities. One of the most important questions regarding household-level 
welfare dynamics is whether being located in a rapidly urbanizing rural area increases a 
household’s chance of falling into poverty. 
 
3.4 HYPOTHESES 
 
In this research I hypothesize that places with higher urbanization rate and higher 
clustering rate also have higher poverty incidences. This hypothesis comes from the observation 
that urbanization that takes place in the rural areas often comes with the cost to the rural 
agricultural sector. 
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The urbanization rate reflects the actual area loss of farmlands to give way to urban 
growth. Because urban uses are established on prime farmlands, this land-cover change reflects a 
loss of primary livelihoods for many rural populations. The relatively low-skilled urban 
population may not be able to find employment in other sectors, despite new openings in newly 
established rural industries. Hence, the urbanization rate can hypothetically predict new 
incidences of poverty. 
 
The clustering rate reflects the fashion in which urbanization occurs. Within a relatively 
similar urbanization rate, a more clustered urbanization represents a relatively more contiguous 
physical land use change. Contiguity in physical land use change over a large area reflects an 
organized development, typically driven by large-scale, corporatized development projects. On 
the other hand, more dispersed physical land use changes reflects decentralized decision making 
over where development occurs. 
 
Dispersed physical land use changes is mainly driven by small land owners building new 
houses. Corporatized development projects are more likely to displace farmers from public or 
community farmlands. Hence clustering rate of urban growth can hypothetically predict new 
poverty incidences in the rural areas or urban peripheries. 
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3.5 DATA 
 
3.5.1. Spatial Data 
 
There is a technical reason behind the nonexistence of research on an important topic like 
this. Especially in developing economies, data on land use is barely available for most of the 
world’s rural areas, including Indonesia’s remote and peripheral regions. Where such data is 
available, records on land ownership and the type of establishments on land are typically not 
publicly available. Thus it is very difficult to evaluate changes of land use over time. 
 
However, it is possible to assess changes of land cover using publicly available land 
satellite images. This paper relies heavily on the interpretation of land satellite images that are 
publicly provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in its Earth Explorer website 
(http://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/). Many versions of land cover images in the format of aerial 
photography and land satellite imaging are provided by this agency. 
 
The resources are notably limited for areas in which the US government agency does not 
have direct interest in geological explorations such as Indonesia. Although detailed information 
is limited, USGS does publicly provide the global land survey’s (GLS) enhanced thematic 
mapper plus (ETM+) images that consist eight spectral bands. Bands 1 to 7 have a spatial 
resolution of 30 meters while band 8’s resolution is 15 meters, each referring to how detailed the 
information is contained within each raster image. Images for year 2000, 2005 and 2010 are 
obtained for the purpose of this research. 
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Each of the 8 bands is sensitive to a specific wavelength spectrum, a mechanism that 
allows for greater accuracy of the satellite imaging’s energy reception from the ground. Band 1 is 
sensitive only to blue spectrum colors, band 2 to green spectrum, 3 to red, 4 to near infrared 
(NIR), 5 to short-wave infrared (SWIR 1), 6 to thermal infrared, 7 to SWIR 2 and 8 is a 
panchromatic band. The first four bands capture all colors that are visible to human eyes, while 
the other bands capture energy reflected from objects on the ground that are not visible to human 
eyes. While the first three bands are good enough to differentiate water bodies from soil and 
vegetation, the other band can produce more specific classification of vegetation species and its 
health status (USGS, 2014). 
 
3.5.2 Socio-Economic Data 
  
This research uses the Social Protection Program Survey (PPLS) of 2008 and 2011, two 
datasets capturing the geographic information of Indonesian poor households. Each of these 
datasets contain the street address of each poor household in the respective year. The original 
datasets contain the names of the poor household heads, their occupations, the demographic 
characteristics of the household members, schooling, disabilities, land & home ownership status, 
source of drinking water, and type of cooking fuel. For the purpose of privacy protection the 
names have been removed from the datasets that I can obtain from Indonesian Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS). However, the kelurahan (sub-district) component, which is an important 
reference locator for this research, remains in the dataset. Additionally, the datasets include the 
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households’ income which can be used as a reference for income cut-off points and occupational 
categories in welfare analysis. 
 
While the datasets are named as “surveys”, in reality they have acted as the census of all 
poor population within the Indonesian territory. The datasets have been used as the basis for the 
service provision of some social protection programs such as cash transfers (BLT), health 
insurance for poor households (Askeskin), and affordable rice for poor households (Raskin). The 
Indonesian national government has also planned to expand the use of these datasets as an 
integrated data base to serve the service provision of all social protection programs at the 
national scale. Thus the coverage of datasets have expanded over time. While PPLS 2008 has 
only covered poor and very poor households, PPLS 2011 have covered all Indonesian 
households within the lowest 40 percent of income level, 24 million households or 96 million 
individuals in real numbers. 
 
There has been very limited shapefile data available for administrative boundaries and 
street references, and the available data from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics are not very 
reliable. Therefore all of the administrative boundaries used in this research are redrawn from a 
combination of political maps provided in Salatiga City’s website as well as an observation of 
land cover in 2010. This has brought an important consequence to the geocoding of poor 
households. Because there is very limited data available for street referencing shapefiles in 
smaller cities such as Salatiga and there is no data available for the most part of rural areas, the 
geocoding can only be done at best up to the kelurahan (sub-district) level, and not to their street 
address levels. 
60 
 
 
Another notable limitation is on population data. While PPLS currently captures poverty 
information up to the individual level, Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS never releases 
population data below the city/county (kota/kabupaten) level. Therefore, population growth 
cannot be used as a control for this study, which aims at predicting poverty at the kelurahan 
(sub-district) level. 
 
3.6 SPATIAL ANALYSIS METHODS 
  
3.6.1 Defining Agricultural Areas  
 
 Because the land satellite images come in nine different raster files for each time a 
satellite image is captured (band 6 comes on high and low gains), the images need to be 
processed before interpretation of changes over time can be done. Electronic geographic 
information system (GIS) can help in this process by calculating the enhanced vegetation index 
(EVI) for each pixel in the raster image provided by USGS’ global land survey (GLS). Formally, 
EVI is calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑐𝑡 = 2.5 ∗  
𝜌𝑁𝐼𝑅𝑐𝑡 − 𝜌𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡
𝜌𝑁𝐼𝑅𝑐𝑡 + (6 ∗ 𝜌𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑡) − (7.5 ∗ 𝜌𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑡) + 1
 
where EVIc𝑡 denotes enhanced vegetation index for each pixel c of 30x30 meters resolution in 
time t, and; 𝜌𝑁𝐼𝑅/𝑅𝑒𝑑/𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑐𝑡 denotes the value of the near infrared/red/blue band’s observation in 
pixel c and time t. 
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EVI is a better classification method than the more rudimentary normalized difference vegetation 
index (NDVI), which only uses red and near infrared bands to determine the presence of 
vegetation. Many researchers in environmental geography use NDVI because it has a very high 
correlation with the leaf area index (Xiao et al., 2002). The problem with NDVI is that 
sometimes it is difficult to take into account different atmospheric conditions. EVI, on the other 
hand, calculate the reflectance of the red band as a function of reflectance in the blue band. 
Therefore EVI is more capable to take into account different levels of residual atmospheric 
contamination, as well as various levels of soil and canopy background (Huete et al., 2002, 
1997). 
 
3.6.2 Calculating Urbanization Rate 
 
Urbanization can be defined as the change of land cover from predominantly agricultural 
into more urban use. To determine the rate of such urbanization, it is necessary to take into 
account the fact that land cover change in rural areas does not happen unilaterally. 
Simultaneously with some farmlands being converted into urban uses, some open lands are also 
transformed into farmlands. Therefore, to determine the rate of urbanization it is necessary to 
subtract the two changes, normalized by the total area of each spatial reference. Formally, 
urbanization rate can be calculated as follows: 
𝑈𝑅𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) =
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1])
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖
 
where i denotes each kelurahan (sub-district); c denotes each pixel in the GLS data, and; (𝑡 −
[𝑡 − 1]) represents changes between two time periods (2000 to 2005 or 2005 to 2010). 
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To avoid confusion, this paper uses a mathematical approach to the calculation of 
urbanization rate. It explains why this method of calculating the urbanization rate suggests that 
conversion of open grassland to farmland cancels out urbanization. In reality, of course, there are 
two separate processes. First, there are open grasslands that are converted into farmlands. 
Second, there are farmlands that are converted into urban uses. However, in relatively small 
regions it is reasonable to assume that farmlands are relatively homogenous and farm work can 
be evenly distributed across all farm land. Therefore, if what we are concerned is mainly the area 
and proportional reduction of cultivable land, from a purely mathematical perspective new farm 
openings can cancel out urbanization rate. 
 
3.6.3 Determining Clustering Level 
 
In general, clustering and dispersion can be analyzed to make inferences that pertain to 
the whole study area or specifically focused on detecting particular cluster locations within the 
studied area. The main difference of the two themes in spatial analysis revolves around whether 
the researcher is interested in global or local analysis (Getis & Ord, 1996; Anselin, 1995); in 
“smooth” or “rough” data (Haining, Wise & Ma 1998, based on Tukey, 1977), or whether he is 
interested in first-order (variation in the mean) or second-order (variation in the covariance) 
effects (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995). 
 
Those who are interested in global analysis typically holds firm the principle of spatial 
dependence. Spatial dependence—often referred to as the first law of geography—implies that 
nearby things are more related than distant things (Tobler, 1970). On the other hand, researchers 
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who are more interested in making very focused and localized analysis typically hold firm the 
principle of spatial heterogeneity. This idea comes from the thinking that places are different one 
from another, which means that the understanding of context is very important in spatial analysis 
(Goodchild, 2004). 
 
What this research uses is a disaggregated global metric to represent clustering and 
dispersion, to represent the uniformity of urbanization process across the study area within one 
sub-district, but to take into account the differences of this process among the different sub-
districts. Technically, what I calculate is the global Moran’s index (Moran’s I) for each 
kelurahan, formally expressed as: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑑𝑖𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑐𝑖𝑡=1
) (
∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑑𝑖𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑐𝑖𝑡=1  (𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡̅̅̅̅ )(𝑥𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡̅̅̅̅ )
∑ (𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡̅̅̅̅ )2
𝑛
𝑐𝑖𝑡=1
) 
where I𝑖𝑡 denotes Moran’s index for kelurahan i in time t; 𝑐 denotes each pixel; 𝑑 denotes each 
neighboring pixel to 𝑐, where 𝑐 ≠ 𝑑; 𝑥 denotes the binary value assigned to each pixel in time t 
(1=agriculture; 0=non-agriculture), and; 𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 denotes the queen contiguity spatial weights 
calculated for each sub-district i in time t.  
 
3.6.4 Predicting Poverty Incidences Using Urbanization and Clustering Rates 
 
The effects of urbanization and the clustering of urban growth on poverty can be 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), as follows: 
(𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀 
where (𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) reflects changes in the poverty incidence in sub-district i between two time 
periods (2000 to 2005 or 2005 to 2010); 𝛽0 represents the intercept of this regression; 𝑈𝑅𝑖∆𝑡 
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represents urbanization rate in that time period; (𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) denotes the clustering rate, which is 
the change of Moran’s index over that period, and; 𝜀 reflects the assumed independent error 
terms. Further, (𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) and (𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) can both be presented as measures of changes, 
formally: 
∆𝑃𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝜀 
 
However, there is reason for us to believe that the error terms in this equation are not 
independent. Given that poverty and welfare is related to livelihood, and livelihood is not a static 
object, there is a possibility that what happens in one kelurahan affects livelihood and poverty in 
another kelurahan. One example of such event is when the observed kelurahan experiences rapid 
urbanization, but the neighboring kelurahan does not. It is reasonable to believe that some of the 
lost rural agricultural jobs in that kelurahan may be compensated by the opening of new 
farmlands in another one, and thus, does not affect poverty levels as much.  
 
To take into account such regional spillover effects, I estimated the impact of 
urbanization and dispersion using two additional regression models, namely the spatial lag and 
spatial error models. The spatial lag model incorporates additional effect of the changes in 
neighboring kelurahan’s poverty incidences into the model. It can be viewed as a spatial filtering 
model, formally expressed as: 
∆𝑃𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝜌𝑊𝑖∆𝑃𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝜀 
whereas 𝑊𝑖 is the queen contiguity weight matrices created individually for each kelurahan; 𝜌 
denotes the parameter of the effect of changes in the neighboring kelurahan’s poverty 
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incidences. It is clear that the model assumes endogeneity, with ∆𝑃𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) being a spatially 
autoregressive variable. 
 
An alternative model to this regression is the spatial error model, which assumes spatial 
dependence in the regression error terms instead of spatial dependence in the neighboring 
kelurahan’s poverty incidence. Formally, the spatial error model is expressed as: 
∆𝑃𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑅𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑖 (𝑡−[𝑡−1]) + 𝜆𝑊𝑖𝜀 + 𝜇 
 
Similarly, 𝑊𝑖 in this model is the queen contiguity weight matrices for each kelurahan. 
However 𝜆 instead of 𝜌 denotes the autoregressive coefficient of the effect of spatially auto-
correlated errors. The non-spatial component of error terms in this model is denoted by 𝜇.  
 
The appropriateness of using either spatial lag or spatial error models will be addressed in 
a later part of the paper. However it is worth mentioning that since the data is not a spatial panel, 
the use of spatial panel regression method is not appropriate here.  
 
3.7 RESULTS 
 
3.7.1 Agricultural and non-Agricultural Areas  
 
 Figure 3.1 below illustrates land cover changes in Salatiga during the study period, 2000 
to 2010. The grey area represents non-agriculture areas, while the white areas represents 
vegetated, agricultural areas. The enhanced vegetation index (EVI) is a very good tool to 
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represent changes and growth of the urban areas at the center of city. The areas of built 
environment in the center of the study area are consistently progressing towards the outer ring of 
the city. 
 
Given that they are calculated using enhanced vegetation index, however, there are far 
more confidence in the qualitative representation of the agricultural areas of the map. The grey 
areas may represent either the built environment or open lands, because both has no vegetation 
on it. This is particularly apparent in the southeastern areas of the city, where some 
inconsistencies appear across the different time period. The non-vegetated areas seem to be more 
concentrated in 2005, but spread closer to the city borders in 2010. 
 
Figure 3.1 Land cover change in Salatiga, 2000-2010 
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Part of the explanation to this inconsistency is because the global land survey imageries 
are taken in the same period, but not at precisely similar dates. Differences in the dates of the 
image taking leads to the photo capture of agricultural fields in different cycles, one before the 
harvesting period and the other one after the harvesting period. Evaluation of this area through 
base map function in ArcGIS 10.2 (ESRI Corporation, 2013) confirms this speculation. 
 
The qualitative evaluation of figure 3.1 confirms the necessity to take into account the 
changes from open land to farm land to calculate urbanization rate. Without taking into account 
such change, the variable urbanization rate will be significantly overestimated because all of the 
grey areas could be calculated as urban areas while realistically they also represent agricultural 
areas after harvesting seasons. 
 
3.7.2 Urbanization 
  
Figure 3.2 below illustrates two land cover changes that really matters to evaluate the rate 
of urbanization in the city. The first land cover change, represented by the green areas, is the 
change from open land to agriculture. These areas were previously grey and become white in the 
subsequent year (refer to figure 3.1). These areas may account for two things: First, it is possible 
that these areas are always agricultural in their use, but during the previous year captured after 
the harvesting season by the GLS satellite imaging. Second, it is possible that these areas were 
open pastures with nothing but low grasses on them, and they were converted into paddy fields 
or other agricultural uses. 
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The second land cover change, represented by red colored areas, are the regions where 
white areas change into grey (refer to figure 3.1), meaning that agricultural areas become less or 
not vegetated in the subsequent years. Like the first land cover change, there is the possibility 
that the red areas represent two events in reality. It may represent the capture of agricultural 
areas after harvesting seasons, or it may represent real changes from agricultural areas into urban 
uses. Subtracting the two possibilities, we can evaluate the real changes from agricultural areas 
into urban uses and normalize it with the total area of each kelurahan in the city of Salatiga to 
obtain each kelurahan’s urbanization rate. 
 
Figure 3.2 Thematic land cover change in Salatiga, 2000-2010 
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Figure 3.2 illustrated that urbanization did not happen uniformly across the city. The 
northeastern areas of the city experienced much more urbanization than the other parts of the city 
during the 2000-2005 period. The distribution of such rapid urbanization change during the 
second period of study, 2005 to 2010, with the northwestern areas having much more areas 
experiencing conversions from farmlands into urban uses. Additionally, however, the 
southeastern areas of Salatiga also experience much of the urbanization process. In general, the 
map confirms that urbanization in Salatiga happens in rapid and sporadic fashion, with 
conversions of farmlands into urban uses happens in dispersed spots across the city. 
 
3.7.3 Clustering of Urban Growth 
 
 Moran’s I represents the association of the values of each pixel with the values of 
neighboring pixels. Essentially, this global index measures the autocorrelation between each 
cell’s values with its neighbors. A positive value of the Moran’s I indicates positive 
autocorrelation, which means that similar values tend to locate closer to each other. A negative 
value signals the opposite. Intuitively, global Moran’s I can be used to make inferences about the 
strength of clustering in each studied area. Subtracting two Moran’s I from two different time 
periods can produce an inference about whether an area experience tendency to have more 
clustering or more dispersion over time. 
 
Figure 3.3 below illustrates changes in global Moran’s index (Moran’s I) for two time 
periods (2000-2005 and 2005-2010) in each kelurahan. The red and orange areas represents 
kelurahans with negative autocorrelation over time, essentially the ones experiencing more 
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dispersions of urban growth. The green and blue areas represents kelurahans with positive 
autocorrelations, which means that growth in those areas tend to cluster over time. The yellow 
areas represents the kelurahans with bordering values. They still demonstrate negative 
autocorrelation, but the small index makes it very difficult to make inferences about whether 
urban growth in these areas have the tendency to cluster or disperse over time. 
 
Figure 3.3 Dispersions of urban growth in Salatiga, 2000-2010 
 
 
Some lessons can be learned from the map. First of all, in general the areas in the outer 
ring of the city tend to have more dispersed urban growth. This is generally true for both time 
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periods, although it becomes much more apparent in the second period of 2005 to 2010. Second, 
the magnitude of this dispersion is far greater in the second period of 2005 to 2010. This may be 
a confirmation of the fact that Salatiga’s industrialization policy has led to rapid, corporatized 
manufacturing industries-driven urban growth in the previously predominantly rural agricultural 
areas. 
 
3.7.4 The Correlation between Dispersion, Urbanization and Poverty 
 
Table 3.1 explains two general conclusions about the correlation between urbanization 
and a dispersed fashion of urban growth in Salatiga. There is no statistical significance for the 
impact of the urbanization rate on poverty. However, there is very high statistical significance on 
the impact of clustered urban growth on poverty. OLS produces satisfactory statistical 
significance below 1 percent level for the impact of clustered urban growth on poverty. More 
sophisticated spatial lag and spatial error models taking into account spatial spillover effects 
produce more statistical significance below 0.1 percent level, which is virtually zero. 
 
The statistical significance of clustering on new poverty incidence is very consistent on 
all poverty measures used against the urbanization and clustering variables. The clustering of 
urban growth can predict changes in the total number of new poor, very poor, poor, and the 
change in number of people who self-report themselves as being poor to be included in PPLS as 
a recipient for social assistance programs. OLS result predicts that one unit increase of Global 
Moran’s Index can be associated to 1,500 new poor people in each kelurahan in Salatiga, 
between 2005 and 2010. This number can be broken down as follows: 359 new very poor, 527 
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new poor, 365 new almost poor, and 254 newly self-reporting poor people added to the existing 
cohort of poor people. Spatial Lag and Spatial Error models predict even higher number of new 
total poor for a unit increase in Global Moran’s I, 1,639 and 1,918, respectively. 
 
However, this result is not statistically significant on those who are identified by PPLS as 
almost poor (those whose income are above 120 percent of the poverty line). Using spatial lag 
model to take into account the spillover effect does not change the statistical significance for this 
account, and the spatial error model can only produce a weak statistical significance slightly 
below 5 percent level. It means that when the threshold of significance is increased, the 
significance of the impact on people who are almost poor disappears. 
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Table 3.1 New Poverty, Urbanization Rate and Clustering of Urban Growth, Salatiga, 2005-2010 
Variables 
OLS   Spatial Lag   Spatial Error 
𝛽   𝜎   𝛽   𝜎   𝛽   𝜎 
Δ Total Poor            
Urbanization Rate 319.72  562.54  304.72  503.61  230.61  375.12 
Clustering of Urban Growth 1,506.07 ** 534.42  1,638.61 *** 478.45  1,917.55 *** 338.50 
Spatial Weights Matrix     -0.37  0.29  -0.98 *** 0.27 
Constant 430.69 *** 50.61  565.62 *** 116.15  429.88 *** 25.76 
Δ Very Poor            
Urbanization Rate 61.88  136.65  69.40  124.25  501.79  84.90 
Clustering of Urban Growth 359.17 ** 129.82  387.00 *** 118.09  77.48 *** 93.89 
Spatial Weights Matrix     -0.25  0.30  -0.95 *** 0.27 
Constant 77.52 *** 12.29  93.68 *** 21.71  80.08 *** 6.47 
Δ Poor            
Urbanization Rate 109.90  196.61  109.21  181.72  97.68  158.84 
Clustering of Urban Growth 527.38 ** 186.78  550.308 *** 172.8245  649.26 *** 147.59 
Spatial Weights Matrix     -0.14  0.29  -0.61 * 0.32 
Constant 144.20 *** 17.69  161.45 *** 39.73  145.15 *** 11.55 
Δ Almost Poor            
Urbanization Rate 37.20  262.50  13.44  229.47  2.57  208.72 
Clustering of Urban Growth 365.28  249.38  383.72  217.99  407.61 * 193.55 
Spatial Weights Matrix     -0.51  0.31  -0.64 * 0.31 
Constant 164.59 *** 23.62  240.09 *** 51.18  162.69 *** 15.09 
Δ Self-Reported Poor            
Urbanization Rate 110.74  84.98  106.10  77.43  106.10  77.43 
Clustering of Urban Growth 254.25 ** 80.73  265.89 *** 73.58  265.89 *** 73.58 
Spatial Weights Matrix     -0.25  0.29  -0.25  0.29 
Constant 44.39 *** 7.65  51.43 *** 11.35  51.43 *** 11.35 
Note: n=22; *<5%; **<1%; ***<0.1% level of significance. 
Poverty data from Indonesian Statistics' (BPS) Social Protection Program Survey (PPLS) 2008 & 2011 
Urbanization rate and level of decentralization calculated from the US Geological Survey's Global Land 
Survey (GLS 2005 & 2010). Thresholds: Very Poor = individuals with income less than 80% of poverty 
income threshold; Poor = individuals with income less than the poverty income threshold; Almost Poor = 
individuals with income more than the poverty income threshold, but less than 120 % of the threshold. 
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3.7.5 Determining the Appropriateness of Spatial Regression Models 
 
Table 3.2 Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence 
  Moran's I   
Lagrange 
Multiplier   Robust LM 
  Value 
p-
value   Value 
p-
value   Value 
p-
value 
Spatial Lag Model    0.60 0.44  2.73 0.09 
Spatial Error Model 1.22 0.22   2.29 0.13   4.42 0.03 
Note: LM=Lagrange Multiplier Test 
 
Table 3.2 above summarized the regression diagnostics to help determine the 
appropriateness of using spatial lag and/or spatial error model. Lagrange Multiple tests result in 
no statistical significance for spatial lag and error model. The initial response to this result is that 
there is no need to use spatial model and to trust results from OLS estimations.  
 
However, the Robust LM tests produces very statistically significant results for both 
spatial land and error models. In this case, spatial error model is more statistically significant at 3 
percent level, which signals its appropriateness to be used in this estimation. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This research does not find a direct relationship between the rapidness of change in land 
cover conversions from agriculture to urban uses with poverty incidences. What this research 
confirms is that the fashion in which that urbanization process takes place is correlated to the 
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changes in poverty incidences. A more centered, clustered, land use change from agriculture to 
urban uses predicts a higher number of newly poor people. A more contiguous land use change 
on large areas signals corporatized real estate or manufacturing industry development type. This 
type of development is more likely to displace people who are dependent on rural agricultural 
livelihood, and thus leads to a higher number of new poor people in the region. Dispersed land 
use changes, on the other hand, reflects a decentralized decision making process. Dispersed land 
use changes may represent individual families building new homes in their respective land plots. 
This type of development does not displace people from their livelihood and does not have 
poverty effect. 
 
This result is not uniform across all levels of economic destitution. Those who are poor 
and very poor are much more affected by the clustered changes in land cover. This signals the 
higher proportion of people in this income category who are dependent on agricultural and land-
based livelihood. Most likely people within this income group are landless and are far more 
affected by land use changes on public or community owned lands. 
  
People from slightly higher income category, identified as almost poor, are less or not 
affected by the spatial configuration of the urban growth. There are two possible explanations for 
this. First, they are likely to be better off because they have more diverse sources of income, and 
not completely dependent on agriculture. Therefore, when there is a massive corporatized 
takeover of public or community owned land, they can shift their focus to earn from other 
available income source. The second possible explanation is that people in this group has their 
own land, albeit the small size, for cultivation purposes. Changes in publicly or communally 
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owned land use do not affect them directly. If they have land, the acquisition of that land will 
most likely be compensated, which means that their income and consumption will not take a 
direct hit. 
 
3.9 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This research confirms that the industrialization policy in Salatiga, with a strong land use 
component that gives a leeway for industrial establishment to take place on prime agricultural 
lands, accelerates the urbanization rate and increases the clustering of urban growth. Local 
municipal governments should have two policy takeaways from this research: First, aggressive 
farm land use conversions to urban uses may imply dispossession and displacement of people 
who are dependent on land for their livelihood. This substantial social cost should be included in 
the cost benefit analysis of any land-use based industrialization policy before they are 
implemented. 
 
Second, people who are displaced from farm lands are not likely to be able to directly 
enter newly established industrial/commercial jobs, and thus will lose their livelihood and fall 
into poverty. Local governments should consider complementing land-use based industrialization 
policy with some labor development approach. People who are potentially displaced from the 
converted farmlands should be retrained to prepare them to enter non-agricultural jobs. If this is 
not a viable solution, then local governments is responsible for a form of compensation as a 
direct consequence of depraving them from their own livelihood.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CAPITAL CONDITIONING: URBAN LAND-USE PLANNING AS THE STATE’S 
INSTRUMENT TO ACCOMMODATE CAPITAL-DEMANDED RURAL-URBAN 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
 
4.1 ABSTRACT 
 
Why do planning agencies make plans that are against the economic needs of their 
constituents? Why do economic-development plans work against the local public interest? This 
case study of rural urbanization-industrialization in Salatiga, Central Java, Indonesia uses a mix-
methods approach with a concurrent nested strategy to help answering those questions. 
Benefiting from interviews, focus group discussions, and reviews of planning documents and 
regional statistics, I discuss the multidimensional mismatches between planning and the public’s 
perspective. I argue that such mismatch is a result of required transformations demanded by the 
interest of capital. To allow for accumulation to happen, capital requires localities to meet certain 
conditions—I call this “capital conditioning”. Planning plays a key role in making sure that the 
locality meets capital conditions through four processes: alteration of perceived future and 
vision, compression of time frame for expected change, restructuring of legal and perceptual 
definition of locality, and redefining the role(s) of the State.  
 
Keywords: planning, capital, urbanization, industrialization, public interest.  
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do planning agencies make plans that are against the economic needs of their 
constituents? Why do economic-development plans work against the local public interest? This 
case study research presents the story of rural urbanization-industrialization of Salatiga, a mid-
sized city in Central Java Province, Indonesia to help explain why. In its effort to industrialize, 
the city annexes and incorporates neighboring rural areas, develop future land use plans in 
incorporated areas, promotes and incentivizes industrial co-locations in the newly annexed areas. 
During this process, however, the city restructures the legal ownership of public lands, 
reorganizes the entire rural land use and allocations, and disfranchises many rural farmers from 
access to publicly owned farm lands. 
 
I organize the paper into three large sections: In the first section I will present the case of 
rural urbanization and industrialization that takes place in Salatiga. This section will discuss the 
history of the annexation-incorporation of the neighboring rural villages into the city and its legal 
implications on rural community lands. One of the most important legal implication of the 
incorporation is the legal restructuring of land ownership, from previously community-owned 
and managed, into becoming publicly owned and commercialized. The section will also present 
the economic implications of this legal restructuring on aggregate income growth, persistent 
concentration of rural poverty, deprivation of rural agricultural livelihood and the unequal 
distribution of welfare impacts across space and between genders. 
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The second section tries to explain why a plan that would bring deprivation to rural 
livelihoods was executed in Salatiga by exploring the multidimensional mismatches between the 
planning agencies’ and the public’s interest, when it comes to effort to achieve economic 
development: (a) Planning agencies and the public have diverging vision about the region’s 
economic future: The city envisions the region as a competitive industrial hub at the heart of the 
province while the local residents dream about local industrial development that revolves around 
capital intensive agriculture; (b) Bureaucratic planning operates within a compressed time-frame 
for research, planning, and implementation of policies. People’s livelihoods, however, are 
subject to family and intergenerational cycles; (c) Locality is often perceived by residents in 
reference to the spatiality of lives and work. Bureaucratic planning, however, is dependent on 
administrative area definitions. Conflicting legal and perceptual definitions of locality leads to 
the different perceptions about equitable distribution of benefits and burden of development; (d) 
People and planners have conflicting views about the role(s) of the State. Planning agencies put 
more emphasis on their responsibility as promoters of economic development. On the other 
hand, people see them as a representation of the State, with ultimate responsibility as the 
guardian of marginal communities.  
 
In the third section, I make the argument that planning’s ignorance of local public interest 
can be explained by understanding the key role of planning in aligning all capital interests and 
meeting capital conditions. Molotch’s (1976) growth machine theory has laid out the basis to 
understand how urban elites can coalesce to exploit land use intensification as a tool for wealth 
accumulation. However, this social theory does not really help us to understand how elites from 
such disparate institutions organize themselves around a common cause (Rast, 1999). More 
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importantly, it is unclear how they can organize themselves around a common land-use based 
strategy. I argue that the planning process is the way all of these interests are mediated, 
negotiated, and accommodated in Salatiga. Planning is the State’s instrument to meet conditions 
demanded by capital prior to its intended wealth accumulation—a tool to satisfy capital 
conditioning. 
 
4.3 PROBLEMATIZING PLANNING: FOUR PROPOSITIONS 
  
To answer the question “why planning agencies make economic development plans that 
are against their constituents’ economic needs and interests”, some research propositions need to 
be developed and tested. The first proposition deals with the probability that planners have some 
form of aspirational disconnect with their constituents, which makes them unable to understand 
their constituents’ vision on the future of the locality. Planning theorists who prefers the 
Habermasian communicative rationality (1968, 1984) favors this explanation. Friedman (1973, 
1987, 1994) suggests that planning should be trans-active, to be situation-specific, decentered, 
and draw potentially affected people into the planning process from the beginning. Variations of 
communicative practices in planning have emerged, for example collaborative planning (Healey 
1997), consensus building (Innes, 1995, 1996; Innes & Booher 1999), mediation or conflict 
resolution (Ruben & Lievrouw, 1990; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Dotson, Godschalk, & 
Kaufman, 1989). 
 
An alternative explanation is what some planning theorists propose as the nature of time-
compression in the planning process. Particularly in disaster management and planning for 
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recovery, a large amount of infrastructure is lost to a certain cause. Time-compression explains 
how the normal process of capital depletion and replacement is conducted in an extremely short 
time to avoid disruptions to services (Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012). The process of 
rebuilding, therefore, is similar to building capital services except that it has to be done in more 
expedient manner. I argue that the context of developing economies presents the same challenges 
with disaster recovery. Developing regions do not experience immediate capital infrastructure 
depletion. However, the fast population growth and lack of public services require those regions 
to generate capital public and private infrastructure investments in an extremely short period of 
time.  
 
The third proposition deals with what Lynch (1960) calls the mental mapping. Lynch, an 
urban planner and architect, proposes that people create mental maps of their surroundings using 
some basic elements, such as paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks. Particularly 
interesting in his study is the notion that mental maps are unique at the individual level, since 
results from individual perceptions and experiences of their surroundings. Planners and 
constituents, both have unique and differing mental maps of the edges (boundaries) and the 
districts of their locality. However, planners are much more bound to the administrative 
definitions of the locality. Meanwhile, people are more attached to their perceived boundaries 
and districting of the city. In this research I propose to compare the two different (and most 
likely conflicting) definitions of the locality—the legal and the perceptual. I also explore the 
social and political implications of planning an economic development when the administrative 
definition of the locality violates the widely accepted, perceptual, traditional demarcation of the 
city’s borders. 
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Last but not least, this research proposes that the explanation to divergences between the 
interest between planning projects and the interest of the common people lies at the differing 
roles of the State. Some planning theorists propose that planning is an integral arm of the 
Capitalist State (Yiftachel, 1989: 33), and therefore cannot be analyzed outside the framework of 
theories about the State. The standard Marxian view of the State is that it plays the role of 
facilitating capital accumulation and legitimizing the capitalistic institutions (e.g. Dear and Scott, 
1981; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987; Hague, 1984; Harvey, 1973). Weberian scholars have more 
nuanced view on the role of the State. Weberian thoughts position the State as to serve multiple 
societal interests, but always guided and performed by a bureaucratic system that is rational and 
independent (Weber, 1978). 
 
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODS 
 
This research uses a mixed-methods approach with concurrent nested design (Creswell, 
2003; Creswell et al., 2003). A mixed-methods approach is the product of a pragmatist paradigm 
which combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches within different phases of research 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008: 22). It mediates the tensions between two opposing paradigms: the 
post-positivist quantitative research and the constructivist/interpretivist qualitative research 
(Terrel, 2012: 258). A “concurrent” strategy means that quantitative and qualitative data is 
collected simultaneously, without a sequence one before the other. Both types of data are used 
simultaneously in the analysis to produce an interpretation of the studied planning process. In 
this case, quantitative data collection is “nested” within the qualitative information collected for 
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the purpose of the research. More priority is given to the primary qualitative data—interviews, 
focus group discussions, and reviews of planning documents to help guide interpretation of the 
planning process studied. Regional statistics are used to clarify, confirm, and sometimes 
challenge, interpretations. 
 
The following table 4.1 summarizes the research propositions and the methods used to 
address the propositions. In general, there are four propositions to be tested in this research, each 
has a specific method that is considered appropriate to address it. 
 
Table 4.1 Research Propositions and Methods 
Propositions Methods Notes 
Aspirational 
disconnect 
- Interviews with planners (6 interviews) 
- Interview with community activists (5 
activists) 
- Interview with dislocated farmers (7 
farmers) 
Community activists include 
heads of 
neighborhood/community 
associations (RT/RW) 
Time-frame 
compression 
- Interview with farmers (7 farmers) 
- Archival research (10 documents) 
Nine (9) city planning 
documents and 1 (one) 
national government 
regulation are reviewed 
Conflicting 
perception of locality 
- Focus group discussions with planners 
and senior officials (3 FGDs) 
- Focus group discussion with farmers (2 
FGDs) 
- Inventory audit of public land resources 
FGDs with planners are 
conducted in the City 
Planning Agency (Bappeda). 
Inventory audit is conducted 
on Kelurahan Noborejo, as an 
example. 
Diverging view on 
the role(s) of the 
State 
- Interview with sub-district (kelurahan) 
administrator  
- Interview with community activists (5) 
Only one lurah (sub-district 
administrator) interviewed 
 
 As the table might suggest, the qualitative component in this research is more dominant. 
Quantitative data will be used to support inferences found in interviews/focus group 
discussions/archival research. If two interview subjects make conflicting claims about a 
particular topic, quantitative data is used to confirm the validity of each claims. For example, in 
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the table above, inventory audit of the land resources was conducted because officials and 
farmers make conflicting claims on whether the incorporation scheme benefits local residents. 
The inventory audit helps to clarify the amount and number of public farmland plots in the 
incorporated areas before and after the incorporation. The distribution of such farmland within 
and outside the incorporated areas will also help understanding the implications of the 
incorporation on farm livelihood. 
 
4.5 CASE STUDY: RURAL URBANIZATION-INDUSTRIALIZATION IN SALATIGA, 
1993-2015 
 
4.5.1 Incorporation of Rural Land as a State-Sponsored Land Grab 
 
In 1997, the City of Salatiga (the city) decided to incorporate Tingkir and Argomulyo, 
two kecamatan (districts) in the adjacent County of Semarang. Within kecamatan Tingkir were 
six desa (villages) of Kutowinangun, Gendongan, Sidorejo Kidul, Kalibening, Tingkir Lor, and 
Tingkir Tengah. Within kecamatan Argomulyo were the six desa of Noborejo, Ledok, Tegalrejo, 
Kumpulrejo, Randuacir, and Cebongan. 
 
This incorporation allows the city to totally transform the institutional setup for land use 
management in the incorporated regions. Rural areas will adopt urban administrative status when 
they are incorporated by an urban municipality, regardless of their current rural characteristics. 
This change in administrative status not only gives the city control over land use, but also 
ownership over previously community-owned lands. 
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Before such administrative change, land use in the incorporated regions was determined 
by a traditional system. Traditionally, privately owned lands in a desa were widely unregulated. 
However a substantial amount of lands were categorized as sawah bengkok, the communally 
owned lands. The Javanese system recognized three main uses of the bengkok land, as lungguh 
(salary lands for village administrator), kas desa (village collective capital), and pengarem-arem 
(administrator’s pensions lands) (Maurer, 1994). The land use of those communal lands was the 
discretion of the village head. On the other hand, property ownership of bengkok belonged to the 
village. Hence the transfer of property was impossible without the agreement of the village 
residents. The village head had the limited authority to decide how much rent will be applied and 
who was eligible to farm on the bengkok land. But he had no right to sell the land. Even lungguh 
and pengarem-arem lands must be returned into kas desa if the village head was deceased or no 
longer served in the position. 
 
The city’s incorporation of rural lands brings sweeping changes to the institutions 
overseeing land use designations. As desa becomes a kelurahan, kepala desa (village head) 
becomes a lurah. A lurah is appointed and paid by the city instead of elected by the villager and 
paid through the rent of lungguh. A lurah also receives the warrant for a pension from the 
government pension fund, thus he is no longer entitled to the rent from pengarem-arem. All of 
the bengkok lands in the incorporated regions thus become kas desa, the collective’s capital. The 
increase in kas desa land, however, does not mean that the incorporated villages have much 
larger discretion over the use of bengkok lands. Instead, because the desas are incorporated, all of 
the property rights over communally-owned lands’ are transferred to the city. Along with this 
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transfer of property right and ownership is the transfer of discretion to designate land use from 
the village heads to the city’s planning department. 
 
Owning abundant land with extraordinary powers over their land use, in 2003 the city 
designated the 12 desa as the city’s new industrial district, outside the city’s core urban areas. 
Through this policy, the city could transfer bengkok lands to private developers to build 
industrial establishments. The transfer of rights over bengkok lands could also happen through 
long term rental agreement. However the magnitude of industrial land use designation is beyond 
the direct sales or rental of bengkok lands. Instead, the industrial designation of the incorporated 
regions allow for the conversion of farm lands into industrial establishments. Consequently, there 
are major land rights transfers beyond the transfers of bengkok lands. Whereas right transfers of 
bengkok involve the city, these outside transfers are only between private land owners and 
industrial capital owners. Thus, outside transfers are beyond the city’s oversight although it is the 
direct impact of the city’s land use policy. 
 
4.5.2 The Transformation of Local Economic Structure and the Aggregate Income Growth 
 
Such aggressive land-use based industrialization policy directly transformed the 
economic structure of Salatiga, as evidently demonstrated by the stagnation of its agriculture, 
relative to income growth in other sectors. The city’s aggregate income from agriculture still 
grew very modestly at slightly above 11 percent between 2005 and 2010. However it 
significantly lagged behind the provincial and national growth at 17 and 40 percent, respectively. 
As a comparison, growth of the city’s agriculture income was even far behind the City of 
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Semarang’s growth at 16.23 percent over the same period. It was quite a stark contrast 
considering that Semarang is Central Java Province’s capital, a much larger agglomeration of 
industries, and has much less share of agricultural lands in comparison to Salatiga (see Table 
4.2). 
 
The much anticipated industrial sector growth as a direct result of aggressive farm land 
use conversion, however, did not come as expected. Over the five year period, Salatiga’s 
manufacturing income grew modestly below 20 percent. This figure is considerably low 
considering that over the same period Semarang’s manufacturing income grew more than 20 
percent for both the county and the city. The figure is even much lower than the provincial and 
national figure, both above 30 percent between 2005 and 2010. 
 
Table 4.2 Regional Sectoral Growth (% Change), 2005-2010 
Region GDRP 
GDRP by Sector 
Agriculture 
Manu-
facturing 
Building 
Construction 
Services Other 
       
Salatiga (City) 26.46 11.07 19.50 48.52 16.64 33.08 
Semarang (County) 24.09 18.96 22.62 21.38 33.60 26.64 
Semarang (City) 31.94 16.23 27.16 48.03 32.54 30.25 
Central Java (Province) 31.90 16.81 33.15 38.36 32.95 35.44 
Indonesia (National) 53.28 40.02 35.44 17.93 23.52 19.94 
              
Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistic(BPS) 
Note: GDRP = Gross Domestic Regional Product. The "other" category includes revenues from mining & 
excavations, utilities sectors, hotels & restaurants, transportation & communications, and finance & 
commercial services. Numbers excludes oil & gas revenues. 
 
Instead of a rapid industrialization, data on regional sectoral growth signals strong 
urbanization effect of the incorporation policy. During the five year period, construction income 
grew almost 50 percent. This change is significantly higher than the provincial and national 
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growth. Quite strikingly, this change is also higher than the growth of aggregate construction 
income of the City of Semarang. This is despite the fact that the City of Semarang is a 
significantly larger agglomeration of industries, commercial, and residential functions. 
Economically speaking, Semarang’s aggregate GDP is almost 24 times larger than Salatiga’s.2 
These figures indicate the strong and growing demand for new construction, as more land 
becomes available for other uses aside of agricultural purposes. 
 
4.5.3 The Development Curse: The Loss of Rural Livelihood and the Impoverishment of Rural 
Farmers 
 
Despite the rosy picture of economic growth at the municipal level, rural industrialization 
in Salatiga also brings a misfortunate impact to the people in incorporated regions, chief among 
them the villagers of Noborejo.  The impact of rural industrialization is devastating to near-poor, 
agricultural populations whose sole access to land as their productive capital was made possible 
through bengkok system. Landless laborers, previously capable to do farming by contracting 
bengkok lots from the village administrators, lose their cultivation land to manufacturing 
company owners. 
 
The loss of agricultural land does not only affect farmers who contract land through 
bengkok. Because the designated land use of the incorporated regions is no longer agricultural, it 
becomes a great disincentive for private land owners to seek rent from farmers. Industrial 
investments become a much more attractive alternative with a higher return to land owners. 
                                                          
2 Consult Appendix C to find the relative size of GDP across the discussed regions. 
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Because most of them have little capital, if any, most of them prefer to sell or rent their land for 
the long term to urban industrial capitalists. Since the majority of farmers are landless, the 
transformation of land use also affects the lands they previously had access to. 
 
In many parts of the incorporated regions, the widespread loss of livelihood can almost 
be solely attributed to the loss of agricultural land. A simple visual observation of a spatial 
poverty mapping from the Data Collection for Social Protection (PPLS) 2011 below can 
demonstrate the relationship between industrialization, unemployment, and poverty status. To 
illustrate, in Rukun Warga (Community Association, RW) where most bengkoks are converted 
from agricultural to manufacturing uses there are more numbers of factories. Ironically, these 
RWs also have the higher share of unemployment and very poor households (rumah tangga 
sangat miskin, RTSM). All of the high poverty and high unemployment RWs are areas where 
most bengkoks had been converted into factories. Most households registered in PPLS as either 
poor or unemployed in those regions are previous agricultural workers who were dislocated from 
the bengkoks. RWs with higher poverty share demonstrate higher poverty incidence than the 
national account at 12.49 percent in 2011 (see figures 4.1 & 4.2 and tables 4.3 and 4.4 from 
Kelurahan Noborejo below as an illustration). 
 
The so-called urbanization effect which brings a substantial growth of the city’s 
aggregate income does not actually lead to the welfare of the residents of incorporated regions. 
Land use transformations from agriculture to industrial and residential do lead to new job 
opportunities in construction industries. However these new job opportunities are not better than 
the lost agricultural livelihoods, both in terms of income stability or the level of income. 
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While being very dependent on the natural seasons, agricultural jobs are still a more 
stable source of income. This is because Salatiga farmers have managed an adaptation by having 
crop alternation techniques. Because rice can only be harvested twice in a year (sometimes even 
only once for fields without permanent irrigation), some farmers have planted red chili in 
between the rice crop planting seasons. Some others have completely moved to plant chili to 
make it possible to have 6 to 7 harvesting seasons, thus giving a yearlong income generating job. 
 
On the other hand, new job opportunities in the construction industry do not provide 
income stability because it is even more seasonal than agricultural jobs. Most of the new 
construction jobs are in infrastructure (road and governmental building), which is very dependent 
on the governmental budgeting cycles. These jobs effectively last for the maximum of six 
months between July and December due to the inefficiency in the local and regional budgeting 
processes. 
 
Since their loss of livelihood comes as an abrupt disruption, most farmers and farm labors 
have little opportunity to seek for alternative job opportunities beyond doing construction jobs. 
When less construction jobs are available (between January and July each year), ex-farmers who 
have lost their agricultural livelihood will 
“,…, do whatever it takes to earn a living. (I) sometimes ride the becak (for hire 
rickshaw taxi), some other times (I) lift weights for vendors and buyers in the 
pasar (traditional food market). (I) do manual labor for factories too, when they 
need and want (it),…, (I) never know (what opportunity comes up),…, just work 
serabutan (a precarious livelihood) as long as (I) can eat.” (An ex-farmer). 
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Figure 4.1 Share of Very Poor Population, 
Kelurahan Noborejo, Salatiga, 2011 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Share of Very Poor Population, 
Kelurahan Noborejo, Salatiga, 2011 
 
RW Households % 
1 36 12.0 
2 16 5.3 
3 48 16.0 
4 54 17.9 
5 38 12.6 
6 33 11.0 
7 32 10.6 
8 21 7.0 
9 18 6.0 
10 5 1.6 
Total 301  
 
Figure 4.2 Share of Unemployed Population, 
Kelurahan Noborejo, Salatiga, 2011 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Share of Unemployed Population, 
Kelurahan Noborejo, Salatiga, 2011 
 
RW Households % 
1 2 10.5 
2 2 10.5 
3 3 15.8 
4 4 21.05 
5 3 15.8 
6 2 10.5 
7 3 15.8 
8 0 0 
9 0 0 
10 0 0 
Total 19 100 
 
 
Source: Map courtesy of BKM Sejahtera Mandiri, Kelurahan Noborejo. 
Data calculated using Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial (Data Collection for Social Protection, 
PPLS) 2011. 
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4.5.4 Unequal Welfare Impact across Regions 
 
 Disruption to livelihood is disproportionately experienced by people in the previously 
rural, incorporated regions. Meanwhile, urban dwellers do not experience such disruption and 
rather enjoy an increase in the demand of their labor as more factories are established. While 
being low-level, low-wage entry jobs, manufacturing employment rigidly requires a minimum of 
high school diploma. This requirement is almost impossible to be fulfilled by the people in 
previously rural, incorporated areas. Thus most of these jobs are filled by urban commuters with 
higher education level than their rural peers. People in incorporated areas who are predominantly 
ex-farmers and ex-farm workers losing their cultivation lands cannot fill these jobs except as 
manual labor without a long term contract. Thus while losing their agricultural livelihood, they 
still do not have access to the production line, which also means no access to higher income or 
income stability. 
 
In the incorporated regions there is a widespread political awareness of the unequal 
distribution of benefits of incorporation and industrialization. The incorporation and the 
subsequent rural industrialization is perceived as 
“,…, a way to bring benefit to the people of the city, not us (in the incorporated 
regions). When I say the people of the city, you know what I mean: the 
municipality. How can they benefit? I don’t know, maybe they get something from 
factory establishments here. We (the residents of incorporated regions) only get 
the unemployment (as the direct impact of the incorporation).” (A teacher and a 
community self-help volunteer at Kelurahan Noborejo). 
 
Some of the interviewed ex-farm workers report that as of today—about a decade after 
the first wave of farm conversions following the incorporation—some of their children have 
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begun to have access to manufacturing employment in the area as they have better access to high 
school education. However, by the time education is attainable for most of ex-farm workers’ 
children, their urban peers have had more access to information about the hiring system through 
formal and informal channels. 
 
The constant, annual re-hiring mechanism applied by manufacturing factories open 
opportunities for internal players to reap benefit from labor hopefuls by illegally soliciting 
money in the hiring process. It is common for each factory to have one or few mandors (group 
head). Aside of running the supervisory function against labors on the production line or manual 
labors outside this line, mandors sometime mediate the hiring process between the factory and 
the individual labor. Both types of workers, those commuting from urban areas and those 
originating from the incorporated regions are subject to this rehiring mechanism and also subject 
to its corrupt practices, thus similarly vulnerable to unemployment at any time. 
 
4.5.5 Gendered Dimension of Work 
 
Although rural livelihood has already been traditionally gendered, environmental 
transitioning in the form of rural industrialization introduces modern forms of gender disparities 
outside the domestic lives. Javanese women have been traditionally stereotyped as nrimo 
(gullible) in general.3 They are more willing to be paid less and work longer hours than their 
male peers at work. 
                                                          
3 There is no direct translation for this social attribute. The literal translation to the Javanese word is “accepting”. 
The word is used to describe someone whose personality allows him/her to live life without much complaining. 
Such person takes much responsibility without worrying too much whether his/her rights are fulfilled.  
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Socially, this gender disparity finds justification in Javanese households’ domestic 
distribution of financial responsibility. Men are typically paid better because they support a 
greater portion of household liabilities. Nevertheless, a number of people have begun to find this 
social justification less relevant. Rather, the difference between men’s and women’s wages is 
because men have some socially accepted lifestyle expenditures. In a construction labor’s words: 
“(Women) are paid less because they do not smoke. When men are paid less (we 
have) no sufficient money to (buy) cigarettes and coffee (bought at coffee stalls).” 
(A seasonal construction labor). 
 
The combination between the social stereotype and the lower market price for women’s 
labor create a social paradox in the incorporated regions: female workers are indeed paid less but 
they are much more employable than their male peers. Unemployment figures for Kelurahan 
Noborejo demonstrate the staggering disparity between male and female employability. In a 
population of 6,000, 4,100 among them in the labor force, only 10 percent of male workers are 
formally employed. This figure is in stark contrast with female employment which reaches 20 
percent. The high share of unrecorded employment does not always indicate unemployment 
because most people work in the informal sector. 
 
The feminization trend of work is not exclusive to the production of traditionally 
gendered goods, such as cigarettes and garment. Quite recently more female workers are 
employed in heavy industries, such as the production of asbestos. Some of the newly established 
factories in the incorporated regions have even made it explicit in their street vacancy 
advertisements that they only look for female workers. Female workers have even been 
employed in the construction industry which is traditionally a domain of the male workers. 
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The gender disparity between men and women in the construction industry is 
demonstrated by both the differences in their wage level as well as their relative “career ladder”. 
Most female labors work as a laden (construction assistant). They can receive up to Rp. 
45,000.00 (US$40) for a 9-hour-day work.4 Male workers in the same position can receive up to 
Rp.50,000.00 (US$ 45) for his work. The significant difference between construction workers’ 
wages will be observable when comparing a laden to a tukang (craftsmen). A tukang, although is 
not certified by any formal institution, is a construction worker with a special skill. A tukang can 
receive wages way upward from the Rp. 50,000 lower limit, sometimes reaching Rp 75,000.00 
(US$85) for his 9-hour-day work. The Javanese construction industry recognizes tukang batu 
(stone and cement craftsmanship) and tukang kayu (woodwork craftsmanship). In any of these 
two categories of tukang, very few women are employed, if any. 
 
4.6 DIVERGENCES: URBAN LAND USE PLANNING, SOCIO-ECONOMIC REALITIES, 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
4.6.1. Diverging visions on the region’s economic future 
 
My interviews reveal that planners and the local residents have diverging visions about 
the future of Salatiga’s economy. Planners and decision makers in Salatiga are far more 
interested in substituting the agricultural economic base with manufacturing industries. The 
mayor, city planners, senior officers, and other government officials often speak of regional 
                                                          
4 Again, there is no direct translation for this word. The word literally means a “server”. A laden is usually an 
apprentice who does all of the leg and manual work for the actual craftsman.  
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ambitions: opening large-scale businesses, opening job vacancies, becoming the rival industrial 
center to Semarang’s industrial zone, and combating poverty. In an analytical report for 
Salatiga’s Detailed Urban Spatial Plan (RDTRK) 2010-2030, the following statements describe 
how urban and regional industrial ambitions is depicted in the document:  
“The City of Salatiga plays a key role as a regional activity center, ……, directed 
as the province’s regional growth center, ……, allowing the conversion of 
farmlands into human settlement and urban uses, ……, allowing the development 
of urban development corridors, promoting co-locations of industrial activities on 
designated industrial areas, …… (Laporan Analisis Rencana Detail Tata Ruang 
Perkotaan Salatiga, Chapter 2 p.2). 
 
 
Meanwhile most of the interviewed farmers and farm laborers have modest dream of 
progressing in their current livelihoods. Some of the planning goals are considered grandeur, but 
very impersonal for farmers and farm laborers. They could not see themselves within the 
regional ambition. They see regional economic development as a project that will benefit 
someone else in another region, not necessarily them who live and work in their respective 
villages. In a farmer’s words: 
“Economic development projects maybe a good thing for those who can benefit 
from them, but not us. It is for someone else’s benefit, whom we are not entirely 
sure who” (A member of a farmer’s saving group). 
 
 
Most within the farming community cannot even see the prospect of leaving agriculture 
all at once. But for those who see such prospect in their lifetime, typically the younger 
generation, they expect that such businesses will branch out from their current agricultural 
activity. Not only that those goals seem to be more achievable for them, but they also aspire to 
accumulate livestock as assets that are transferable to the next generation. Most of them contend 
that working in manufacturing industries or other jobs outside agriculture will not let their kids 
have anything to inherit from them. 
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“I don’t want to work in a factory. I currently have one cow and one goat. 
‘Success’ to me means that I can have two or three, rather than one, livestock,….., 
(raising) both milk and meat producing cows rather than goats; having more land 
to cultivate; or becoming a local supplier of tropical fruits, so I can leave 
something for my kids when I am gone (passed away).” (A very senior local 
farmer). 
 
 
4.6.2 Mismatched Time Frame for the Expected Change 
 
Like many officers in bureaucratized agencies, planners in Salatiga are bound to the 
annual budgeting and planning cycles. On top of their own workflow, they need to consult their 
work with regional planning agencies at the provincial and national levels at certain times of the 
year. Salatiga’s RDTRK is supposed to be a long term (20 years, 2010-2030) guide of the city’s 
urban development. However, the development policy is prescribed within 5 years increments. 
 
Bureaucratic planning views economic development as an event that can be studied, 
planned, and executed within an annuity basis. Economic development planning thus frames the 
local economic problem as simplified challenges to job creation and income generation. The 
mantra of local economic development is “create jobs, raise local average income”. 
Simplification of economic problems help planners formulate measurable and achievable 
planning goals within a bounded and relatively short time frame. In a senior planning officer’s 
words: 
“We had to deliver a plan in such a limited time, and we couldn’t just write a 
plan, it had to be a good plan! It was not an easy thing to do given our other 
responsibilities here. The plans needed to be reviewed by our superiors on 
January, consulted with the local house of representative (DPRD) on February, 
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consulted with the provincial and state planning agency on March and legislated 
sometime in May/June. And then the land use plan bound the implementation for 
the upcoming 5 years.”(A senior planning officer). 
 
 
The fear that industries would choose to locate somewhere else adds the pressure to come 
up with the land use plan that accommodates industrial uses as soon as possible. In a planning 
officer’s words: 
“If we don’t come up with land use designation, those industries will establish 
their factories right outside the city borders anyway. Rather than seeing them go 
to the County (of Semarang) we’d rather have them here. Besides, if they locate 
outside the city border, we will still get the passerby’s traffic (generated by the 
industrial trucking). Might be better for us to act fast and provide them the land 
they need.” (A mid-level management planner). 
 
 
On the contrary, many farming households see development as something that happens 
over the course of their lifetime and often times cross generations. Most of the older farming 
workers and farm owners cannot care less about acquiring new skills to be involved in the newly 
created manufacturing jobs. But most of them encourage their children to go to school to be able 
to work in the new jobs. Very few objects to the notion that the place they live will change, 
becoming more urbanized and industrialized. But many find it really hard when all of a sudden 
their livelihood is no longer feasible because the land they cultivate are converted into factories. 
Most rural villagers expect that their work as farmers end when “their body is no longer capable 
of performing the task”. They do not know the concept of retirement. Very few can foretell that 
they have to quit farming activities before the end of their life. 
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“That is my daughter’s motorbike (proudly pointing at a sport bike in front of the 
house). She earns the money by working for a garment factory. Her sister is 
finishing high school and soon will join her there, or find a better factory job. 
They can do better than me, and I am happy to see they are getting better jobs. 
(But) I am old, and until my time comes I will work in the field,….., if I am still 
allowed to (because now the public farm lands are no longer accessible for local 
farm workers)” (An old local farmer). 
 
4.6.3 Conflicting Legal, Perceptual, and Territorial Definitions of Locality 
 
Planning and policy-making has a very abstract view of locality. The administrative 
change during the incorporation of adjacent villages transforms the legal status of some rural 
areas into urban areas. From the legal, judicial, and administrative perspective, those rural areas 
that were previously an outside region becomes part of the new locality. The city then views the 
land as part of their territory and the people of the incorporated region as their citizens. 
 
The people’s perception in the incorporated regions, however, does not change as 
drastically as the legal definition. The perception of rural locality is so small, often 
geographically includes only people in a small housing compound. A different compound in the 
same village is considered a different hamlet, and thus the people who live there are considered 
as “others”. 
 
The challenge of planning when there is very different perception of locality is how 
difficult it is to create an image of equitable distribution of benefits and burden of development. 
The new manufacturing industries can be considered by the city as equitable provider of 
employment because they prioritize local workers in Salatiga. However, employing people from 
non-incorporated regions are not considered as employing locals by ex-farmers and ex-
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landholders who lost their cultivation land. They do not consider themselves as “citizen of 
Salatiga”. They call people from the non-incorporated regions as “the city people”, which is a 
practice of differentiating and distancing themselves politically from them. 
“All of these recent developments, that (asbestos) factory over there, the chicken 
feed (storage facility), and the paint (factory), they all don’t really benefit us, 
village people. Most of the employees working there are from (non-incorporation 
area of) the city. I once surveyed my own residents to find out how many works in 
factories around here. I could only find 6 people. Six! Out of 300 employees at 
that time! We don’t get any benefits from development. We just get the 
unemployed (people who lost rural agricultural livelihood because they lose 
access to public farmlands. ” (An ex-head of a neighborhood association). 
  
 
The following table 4.5 further explains how the different definition of locality could 
create major changes in the territoriality of work and life, using just the example of Kelurahan 
Noborejo in Salatiga. Prior to the incorporation, the sub-district owned 75 land plots, all of which 
were located in its territory. More than 38 percent of those land plots were wet paddy fields. 
While 62 percent were dry fields, they were all used for cultivation purposes, mainly for farmers 
to grow Napier grass for cattle feed. 
 
The incorporation that led to many land swaps involving public farm lands changes the 
spatial distribution of these public lands. Nowadays 42 percent of the public land is located 
outside Kelurahan Noborejo, although still in the city of Salatiga. Some of these lands are 
located in Kelurahan Pulutan, which is far up North, at least 5 km from Noborejo. The remaining 
land left in the kelurahan are dominated by dry lands, which produces cattle feed but not rice, 
which is a livelihood supporting crop. The area of paddy fields in the kelurahan is drastically 
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reduced, from 83,000 to a mere 19,000 m2. If on average a farmer rent 1,000 m2 from the 
kelurahan, the remaining land will only support less than 20 renter farmers livelihood. 
 
Table 4.5 Land Inventory Before and After Incorporation, Kelurahan Noborejo, Salatiga 
Land Inventory  Before   After  
  numbers 
in 
%   numbers 
in 
% 
      
Number of Land Plots 75 100  97 100 
    in the kelurahan 75 100  58 60 
    outside the kelurahan  0  39 40 
      
      
Land Area (m2) 218,998 100  342,568 100 
      
    in the kelurahan 218,998 100  198,515 58 
             dry land 135,744 62  140,980 41 
             paddy fields 83,254 38  18,910 6 
             urban uses    38,625   11 
      
    outside the kelurahan    144,053 42 
             dry land    18,305 5 
             paddy fields    125,748 37 
            
Source: Kelurahan Noborejo, City of Salatiga 
 
There is a territoriality problem which extends beyond the perception of locality when a 
region is incorporated by a city. Rural agriculture is naturally a very territorial work. Farmers 
cannot work in farmlands that are too far from their house because they have to come twice a day 
(in the morning and in the afternoon) to their fields. Many farmers work within walking distance 
(less than 30 minutes of walking) from their fields. Such territoriality issue doesn’t exist for 
manufacturing work. Factory workers are typically more skilled workers and with higher wages 
they can afford private means of transportation such as a motorbike. Many factory workers 
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commute from areas that are up to 45 minutes of riding a motorbike, which is substantially 
further than 30 minutes of walking. 
 
The real issue comes when planning is ignorant of the different scale of the territorial 
nature of work for the two different economic sectors. The national regulation rules that strategic 
public assets such as land cannot be sold or transferred to private parties. Hence when the city 
transfers development rights on public property to private developers, it has to do it through land 
swap mechanisms instead of selling land. The national regulation however only stipulates that 
private developers have to swap the public land with another plot of land or multiple plots of 
land with the same value (Kemenkumham, 2014). The land swap often results in public land 
being scattered in other regions very far from the incorporated regions, where the original public 
land is taken away from landless farmers. The land that are offered for land swap by developers 
also often comes in inaccessible topographies or lower soil qualities, which makes it less suitable 
for cultivation purposes. 
“I used to work on the bengkok (public land) in front of the Lurah’s office. It’s 
close to where I live, so I can come there in the morning and in the afternoon to 
water my plants or work the soil. But now it has been acquired by developers, I 
am not sure what it is for. The developers swap it with a land in the northern part 
of the city. It’s too far for me to work there so now I only work on a smaller plot 
that I have here. Pak (mention a name) can still work on public lands because he 
has more capital than I do. He can hire locals in the northern region to work on 
that land. We people with small capital cannot do such thing.” (An ex-farmer) 
 
4.6.4 Conflicting Views on the Role(s) Of the State 
 
The city (administration) is widely seen as the representation of the State, but not always 
the representation of the public. Many people in the incorporated regions are well-aware of the 
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nuanced political accountability of their local administrator before and after incorporation. A 
kades (rural village head) is democratically elected by the people while the lurah (sub-district 
administrator) is appointed by the mayor. The rural villagers in incorporated regions are quick to 
recognize that the lurah often times is not only not well informed about local issues, but is less 
concerned about finding a solution for them. Lurah is seen as “guy who brings the mission of the 
city people, for the benefit of the city people”. In a certain way, the villagers believe that the 
lurah plays his role as the agent for development in the region. 
“What does a lurah do? Does he even know our problems? He only sits at his 
office, signing off (administrative) documents, (signing requests for) ID cards, 
those things. I am sure he doesn’t even know the area well. And I am pretty sure 
he is (dishonestly) involved in the land swap process. The developer often sits 
with him in his office. I am sure they talk about which land the developer can 
acquire. Who does he represent? Us or the developers?” (A community activist). 
 
 
Even among farmers, there are different perception and expectation for the State. Farm 
owners do not expect the city to help them develop their farming business but at least protect the 
legality of their tenure on land. Their main interest if to secure buying and selling land to 
maintain liquidity of their assets. Farm holders (landless farmers who have access to 
community/public land through renting or other means) do not expect the state to redistribute 
land to landless farmers but at least protect their tenure on community land. Farm laborers are 
among the most skeptical people in the village. They do not really expect the State to have a role 
in their life. 
“Anyone who gets elected (as a mayor, governor, or president) doesn’t change 
my life. My life will always be like this.” (A seasonal farm labor). 
 
 Prior to the incorporation, land resource allocation was performed by a communitarian 
traditional system instead of run by the State. In the traditional system, many farmers have 
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almost exclusive access to community land. The traditional exclusive farming rights resemble 
tenure on community farmlands. Farmers cannot own the community land. But there is a non-
competitive land market. Community-owned land can be rented to farmers for very cheap price 
each year, and the contract often extends automatically. That being said, such traditional rights 
do not guarantee inclusiveness of access to community land for all community members. Some 
farmers benefit more from being able to rent land and become capitalist farmers, although they 
are only renters and not owners of the farm land. 
“A tenant farmer (on a bengkok land) rents the land from the kades through an 
agent. The next year, he just needs to talk to the agent again to extend the 
contract. Some people get 1000 m2, some get more. But generally a plot is about 
1000 m2, and each farmer get one plot. Some can get more if they win the lottery 
for it.” (An ex-tenant farmer on bengkok land). 
 
The incorporation, however, changes how much role the State has in the rural residents 
lives. The incorporation of rural land means that the State now obtains the rights to (re)distribute 
land resources to serve their interests. Inequitable land distribution happens through two 
channels: First, most of public land is transferred to private developers for real estate or factory 
development, thus depraving many farmers indiscriminately of their livelihood. Second, even 
among farmers there has been inequitable redistribution of land resources. Because the land swap 
changes the location of public land in the city, some farmers are unable to work on those land 
because they are too far from their homes. It gives a way for farmers with more money and 
resources to rent more land in more distant locations, thus unequally redistribute land among 
farmers who were previously renters on the community/public land. Previously, each farmers 
could rent up to 1,000 square meters of community land. Some farmers with more resources now 
can rent up to 5,000 square meters while others cannot rent land at all. 
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4.7 DISCUSSION 
 
4.7.1 An Antiquated Explanation: The Growth Machine 
 
How do we explain why planners make plans that are against the economic needs of their 
constituents? How do we explain why economic-development plans greatly diverge from the 
local public interest? Using the case study of Salatiga’s rural urbanization-industrialization to 
answer these questions requires understanding the importance of urban land-use and the 
authority to plan future changes in urban land use. 
 
Molotch (1976) proposed a political economic lens to explain why regions induced upon 
themselves the physical transformations that would create sweeping land use changes. Molotch 
saw the city and any locality as the spatial expression of the capitalist interest, especially the 
land-based elites. In Logan and Molotch’s words “…virtually all place entrepreneurs and their 
growth machine associates, regardless of geographical or social location, easily agree on the 
issue of growth itself” (in Urban Fortunes, 2007: 32). The growth machine—a loosely defined 
coalition of chambers of commerce, newspapers and politicians—advocated for economic 
development through the channel of land use intensification. The main rhetoric of the growth 
machine was economic development. The reason why the growth machine could create such a 
broad-based coalition was the perception that economic growth can solve some other social 
issues, in particular unemployment.  
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The growth machine theory partly explains why it is so difficult to protect farmland from 
speculative commercial land exchanges. Farmland preservation—a measure that limits the 
amount of farmland that can be converted into urban uses—is a direct challenge to the activities 
of land based elites. Land commodification that is associated with urbanization is the ultimate 
source of wealth accumulation and power concentration (Pfeffer & Lapping, 1994). 
 
The widespread use of this theory has been a testimony of how universal the idea of 
urban coalition for economic growth is, despite the peculiarity of American urban governance in 
which the theory was contextualized. Growth machine has been used to explain urban 
transformations in authoritarian states like China (e.g. Zhang, 2014) or post-communist Eastern 
Europe (e.g. Valiyev, 2014). It has also been used to explain why people align their support for 
the gaming tourism despite the industry’s harm to the residents (e.g. Harrill et al., 2011), why 
community’s opposition to development often ends with a negotiation and a legally binding 
community benefits agreements (e.g. Harrill et al., 2011), and why cities try to ban the use of 
public spaces by homeless people (e.g. Anderson, 2015). 
 
Unexplored in the theory, however, the remaining question about how the multiple and 
sometimes conflicting interests of capital organizes itself to produce a solid land-based strategy 
for the purpose of wealth accumulation. In the United States, where the theory is contextualized 
and developed, the growth machine is mainly driven by chambers of commerce, private utility 
companies, conservative news outlets, transnational corporations, and a very established 
governance. In that context, business interests can organize, unify, and represent the interest of 
capital. However, in the context of a developing economy/region where the stakeholders are 
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farmers, small and developing corporations, state-controlled utility companies, and a pre-mature 
governance, it is difficult to imagine the presence of such coalition to work as the growth 
machine. The question that remains is, in the context of developing economy and in this case in 
Salatiga, how does capital interest represent itself, solidify its demands, and making sure they are 
met for the purpose of wealth accumulation? 
 
4.7.2 Planning’s Key Role in Accommodating Capital Conditions 
 
I argue that planning plays a key role in unifying the interest of capital, formulating 
capital demands, and meeting capital conditions through a chain of processes: To begin with, 
planning is inherently the work of those who supplants a local vision on economic future with a 
modernist one. People in the incorporated rural villages consider their area as an agricultural 
region. Development, in their view, is a progressive path towards the intensification of 
agriculture and the increase of farming-related assets. This family-based, incremental, change is 
considered by local farmers as a “natural” path towards economic progress. The enterprise of 
planning, however, is bound by the interest of capital and perceives economic development as a 
result of a capital business operation. Through the incorporation of rural areas, planning 
introduces regional economic ambitions that are fueled by capital-intensive manufacturing 
industries to formerly agricultural regions. 
 
Alteration of local vision is useless without an effort to fix a timeline for an expected 
result, hence planning essentially plays the role in compressing the time for expected change. 
Planning creates cycles of analysis, plan formulation, implementation and evaluation to speed up 
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the process of delivering a policy, in this case a land-based strategy to generate economic 
growth. In doing so, the expected result is no longer reliant on natural, human-based lifecycles 
that can delay the delivery of the expected result. Without such time compression, planning will 
not be able to deliver the results unless there is a rapid and significant generational shift. In the 
case of Salatiga, the preference to work in manufacturing industries instead of agriculture 
represents this generational shift. However it was reached not without the social cost of putting 
so many farm workers into unemployment since they are disfranchised from access to cultivating 
public lands. 
 
To avoid further conflicts, planning needs to extend beyond individual perceptions of 
what, who and where is considered local—which prompts it to restructure the whole legal 
definitions of the locality. In the case of Salatiga, the incorporation transforms some rural by 
absorbing it into the administrative region of Salatiga. Legally, the incorporated area residents 
are no longer rural people, but citizens of the city administration. Within the legal definition, 
they share their citizenship with other city residents, and have to compete in the same labor and 
job markets. Thus when they are disfranchised from accessing the public farm lands because 
those lands are sold to factories, the city does not frame their problems as an example of 
urban/regional/global capital taking over rural lands and dislocating rural people. Instead, they 
view the problem simply as the modern industries taking over a backward, less productive 
economic sector. The restructuring of legal definitions of locality deprives people from the 
incorporated regions their political identity and thus, makes them anonymous in policy analysis 
and evaluation. 
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To ensure that all of the above-mentioned processes are unchallenged, planning must be 
involved in redefining the role of the State. Most importantly, planning must arm the State with 
new powers over land and property ownership. Salatiga is a clear example of the State’s exercise 
of power, not only to appropriate community lands, but also to transfer development and 
ownership rights of those lands to the capitalist class. The State thus does not only own lands, 
but also reserves the right to regulate and redistribute land, which is the single most important 
factor in economic production. The following table 4.6 below summarizes all of the planning 
issues, the role of planning, and capital conditioning outcomes.  
 
Table 4.6 Key Elements of Planning’s Role in Facilitating Capital Conditioning 
Planning issues Planning’s Role Capital Conditioning Outcomes 
Low desire for intensive 
land-use designation 
Altering the locality’s 
perceived economic future, 
supplanting it with a modernist 
vision  
Formalization of capital-driven regional 
ambition for capital-intensive, high-
growth, high-profit industries which 
requires intensive land use designations. 
Urban transformation is 
subject to 
intergenerational change 
and transfers 
Compressing the time-frame 
of planning, implementation 
and evaluation of proposed 
policies 
Legalization of drastic measures: i.e. 
State-sponsored land-grabs to expedite 
land resources reallocation from 
agriculture to manufacturing industries. 
Conflicting views on the 
borders of local powers 
and authorities 
Sorting out conflicting views 
by restructuring the legal and 
spatial definitions of the 
locality 
- Dismissal of traditional and 
perceptual definitions of locality 
- Formalization of administrative 
definitions 
The State has limited 
powers 
Redefine the role of the State 
with respect to urban land 
allocations 
The State is vested with new powers to: 
- Own and transfer property rights 
- Regulate land use 
- Designate land for capital-driven 
intensive industrialization purposes. 
 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the context of a developing, transforming rural economy, planning plays a key role in 
identifying, unifying, representing, and accommodating the interests and the demands of capital. 
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Planning sort out the multidimensional mismatches between the interest of capital and the 
existing socio-economic realities through four processes: (a) alteration of the local vision about 
the region’s economic future and substitute it with a modernist one; (b) compression of the time-
frame for expected change; (c) total restructuring of legal definitions of locality, and (d) 
redefining of the role(s) of the State. While all of these four processes can be true in many cases, 
planning does it best in its main responsibility as the sole governing institution that supervises 
urban land use.    
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CHAPTER 5 
EPILOGUE 
 
5.1 Lessons Learned 
 
There are four important takeaways from the previous findings in this research. First, this 
study provides a strong evidence that securing landholding can help maintaining farming 
households’ income and consumption, while taking away land will unequivocally create a 
livelihood shock for affected farming households. My finding suggests that most households that 
maintain work in agriculture could not find alternative income sources to weather an income 
shock that is caused by losing landholding. More importantly is what that income reduction 
means to the quality of life. Almost all of those loss are experienced through a reduction in non-
food consumption. What that generally means is that when a farming household lose income 
from losing their landholdings, they would experience one of the following: not having money to 
buy enough clothing and personal expenditures, stop sending their children to school, not buying 
electricity and clean water, or not seeing the medical doctor when they are ill. 
 
Second, it provides evidence of an economic pressure for people who choose to stay in 
agriculture when their surrounding environment is becoming more urbanized. It is true that the 
total income of farming households in urbanizing regions are not falling like their income from 
agriculture. However, the growth of their total income is smaller than the one enjoyed by their 
peers in relatively unchanging rural regions. This finding suggests that even if urban farmers are 
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able to find alternative income sources, the amount made from those other incomes will not 
sufficiently cover the loss of income from agriculture.  
 
Third, and most importantly, the negative effects of urbanization, such as income loss 
experienced by farming households, occur through some forms of loss in rights to use land for 
cultivation purposes. This finding supports a reasonable assumption that urbanization leads to 
some levels of land use changes that are hostile to agricultural households. In plain, layman 
terms, it means that urbanization leads to people’s displacement from farming lands, and 
displacement leads to the shock in income and consumption for people who cannot find 
alternative employment when they are depraved of agricultural livelihood. 
 
Fourth, this research confirms is that the fashion in which that urbanization process takes 
place is correlated to the changes in poverty incidences. A more centered, clustered, land use 
change from agriculture to urban uses predicts a higher number of newly poor people. A more 
contiguous land use change on large areas signals corporatized real estate or manufacturing 
industry development type. This type of development is more likely to displace people who are 
dependent on rural agricultural livelihood, and thus leads to a higher number of new poor people 
in the region. Dispersed land use changes, on the other hand, reflects a decentralized decision 
making process. Dispersed land use changes may represent individual families building new 
homes in their respective land plots. This type of development does not displace people from 
their livelihood and does not have poverty effect. 
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5.2 Policy Implications 
 
This research confirms that the industrialization policy with a strong land use component 
that gives a leeway for industrial establishment to take place on prime agricultural lands 
accelerates the urbanization rate and increases the clustering of urban growth. Aggressive farm 
land use conversions to urban uses may imply dispossession and displacement of people who are 
dependent on land for their livelihood. This substantial social cost should be included in the cost 
benefit analysis of any land-use based industrialization policy before they are implemented. 
 
People who are displaced from farm lands are not likely to be able to directly enter newly 
established industrial/commercial jobs, and thus will lose their livelihood and fall into poverty. 
Local governments should consider complementing land-use based industrialization policy with 
some labor development approach. People who are potentially displaced from the converted 
farmlands should be retrained to prepare them to enter non-agricultural jobs. If this is not a 
viable solution, then local governments is responsible for a form of compensation as a direct 
consequence of depraving them from their own livelihood. 
 
5.3 Introspections for the Discipline of Planning 
 
This research contributes to a long list of critical inquiries that refuses to give 
professional the benefit of the doubt of its roles in the perpetuation of injustices and economic 
destitution. I argue that planning plays a key role in creating urban transformations that are 
designed to meet the demands of capital. Conventional wisdom stipulates that planning’s role is 
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within the mental realm of reimagining and reshaping the economic future of the locality in 
which it is implemented. However, my study shows that planning plays a much larger role. It 
plays a role in creating a time-compression effect to expedite the process of urban 
transformation, so that wealth accumulation can occur in a relatively shorter time. It also helps 
restructuring the legal definitions of locality, by completely dismissing the perception of what, 
who and where is considered local. Most importantly, planning plays a great role in helping the 
State redefining its roles by vesting new powers over land use designations. In my case study, it 
even decorates the State with property rights over lands that were supposedly community-owned. 
In this case planning directly accommodates state-sponsored appropriation of public lands. 
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APPENDIX A. INCOME AND CONSUMPTION DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE FOR 
LAND-LOSING VS LAND-MAINTAINING FARMERS, 2000&2007 
 
Variables N 
  Group Means  
(in IDR 1 million) 
  Alternative 
Hypothesis   
  T=0 T=1 All   T=0 T=1 All   < 0 ≠ 0 > 0 
            
INCOME            
  Total Income            
      Income 2000 2,372 270 2,642  8.26 5.12 7.94  0.92 0.17 0.08 
     (0.76) (0.59) (0.69)     
      Income 2007 2,372 270 2,642  11.27 6.58 10.79  0.96 0.08 0.04 
     (0.89) (0.69) (0.81)     
      Change 2,372 270 2,642  3.02 1.45 7.94  0.68 0.65 0.32 
     (1.04) (0.79) (0.69)     
  Farming Income            
      F. Inc. 2000 2,372 270 2,642  4.87 3.60 4.74  0.85 0.30 0.15 
     (0.41) (0.41) (0.37)     
      F. Inc. 2007 2,372 270 2,642  6.34 3.47 6.05  1.00 0.00 0.00 
     (0.23) (0.37) (0.21)     
      Change 2,372 270 2,642  1.47 -0.13 1.31  0.89 0.23 0.11 
     (0.45) (0.46) (0.40)     
            
CONSUMPTION            
  Total Consumption            
      Cons. 2000 2,338 269 2,607  20.64 21.02 20.68  0.34 0.68 0.66 
     (0.30) (0.99) (0.29)     
      Cons. 2007 2,267 259 2,526  25.00 23.29 24.82  0.94 0.12 0.06 
     (0.35) (0.98) (0.33)     
      Change 2,299 260 2,559  4.35 2.27 4.13  0.92 0.16 0.08 
     (0.47) (1.15) (0.44)     
  Food Consumption            
      Food 2000 2,367 270 2,637  14.05 14.07 14.05  0.49 0.97 0.51 
     (0.21) (0.60) (0.19)     
      Food 2007 2,362 267 2,629  15.87 15.17 15.80  0.83 0.35 0.17 
     (0.24) (0.66) (0.22)     
      Change 2,366 267 2,633  1.63 1.11 1.58  0.70 0.60 0.30 
     (0.32) (0.70) (0.29)     
  Nonfood Consumption            
      Nonfood 2000 2,358 269 2,627  7.34 6.97 7.30  0.72 0.56 0.28 
     (0.20) (0.58) (0.19)     
      Nonfood 2007 2,309 262 2,571  10.88 9.42 10.73  0.96 0.08 0.04 
     (0.26) (0.74) (0.25)     
      Change 2,311 262 2,573  3.30 1.98 3.17  0.91 0.18 0.09 
     (0.32) (0.91) (0.30)     
                        
Null hypothesis: mean difference between land-losing and land-maintaining farmers = 0. Alternative 
hypothesis: mean difference is <0, ≠0, or > 0. Difference is defined as mean (T=0) - mean (T=1). Change is 
defined as difference 2007 - difference 2000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each estimate 
value. 
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APPENDIX B. INCOME AND CONSUMPTION DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE FOR 
FARMERS IN URBANIZING VS UNCHANGING REGIONS, 2000 & 2007 
 
Variables N 
  Group Means  
(in IDR 1 million) 
  Alternative 
Hypothesis   
  T=0 T=1 All   T=0 T=1 All   < 0 ≠ 0 > 0 
            
INCOME            
  Total Income            
      Income 2000 2,480 162 2,642  7.46 15.20 7.94  0.00 0.01 1.00 
     (0.60) (6.37) (0.69)     
      Income 2007 2,480 162 2,642  10.38 17.09 10.79  0.02 0.05 0.98 
     (0.67) (8.29) (0.81)     
      Change 2,480 162 2,642  2.92 1.90 2.86  0.59 0.81 0.41 
     (0.88) (10.36) (1.04)     
  Farming Income            
      F. Inc. 2000 2,480 162 2,642  4.50 8.46 4.74  0.00 0.01 1.00 
     (0.22) (5.03) (0.37)     
      F. Inc. 2007 2,480 162 2,642  6.22 3.48 6.05  1.00 0.00 0.00 
     (0.20) (1.27) (0.21)     
      Change 2,480 162 2,642  1.72 -4.98 1.31  1.00 0.00 0.00 
     (0.26) (5.21) (0.40)     
            
CONSUMPTION            
  Total Consumption            
      Cons. 2000 2,447 160 2,607  20.68 20.62 20.68  0.52 0.96 0.48 
     (0.30) (1.02) (0.29)     
      Cons. 2007 2,373 153 2,526  24.68 26.98 24.82  0.05 0.10 0.95 
     (0.34) (1.44) (0.33)     
      Change 2,405 154 2,559  4.04 5.57 4.13  0.20 0.41 0.80 
     (0.46) (1.44) (0.44)     
  Food Consumption            
      Food 2000 2,475 162 2,637  14.12 12.91 14.05  0.93 0.14 0.07 
     (0.20) (0.58) (0.19)     
      Food 2007 2,468 161 2,629  15.67 17.78 15.80  0.01 0.02 0.99 
     (0.22) (1.17) (0.22)     
      Change 2,472 161 2,633  1.36 4.88 1.58  0.00 0.00 1.00 
     (0.30) (1.17) (0.29)     
  Non-Food Consumption            
      Nonfood 2000 2,465 162 2,627  7.20 8.91 7.30  0.02 0.03 0.98 
     (0.19) (0.99) (0.19)     
      Nonfood 2007 2,415 156 2,571  10.68 11.51 10.73  0.21 0.43 0.79 
     (0.26) (0.90) (0.25)     
      Change 2,416 157 2,573  3.17 3.17 3.17  0.50 1.00 0.50 
     (0.31) (1.22) (0.30)     
                        
Null hypothesis: mean difference between land-losing and land-maintaining farmers = 0. Alternative 
hypothesis: mean difference is <0, ≠0, or > 0. Difference is defined as mean (T=0) - mean (T=1). Change is 
defined as difference 2007 - difference 2000. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each estimate 
value. 
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APPENDIX C: SALATIGA’S SECTORAL GROWTH, 2005-2010 
 
Region 
GDRP   
(billion 
Rupiahs) 
GDRP by Sector 
Agriculture 
Manu-
facturing 
Building 
Construction 
Services Other* 
       
Salatiga (City) 
2005 722.00 46.97 150.76 38.84 140.48 345.01 
2010 913.02 52.17 180.16 57.69 163.85 459.15 
% change 26.46 11.07 19.50 48.52 16.64 33.08 
       
Demak (County)   
2005 2,471.00 1,061.20 279.78 162.84 245.13 722.31 
2010 3,020.82 1,259.94 315.76 193.35 359.80 891.97 
% change 22.25 18.73 12.86 18.74 46.78 23.49 
       
Kendal (County) 
2005 4,277.00 1,027.49 1,716.52 117.46 336.45 1,079.43 
2010 5,392.97 1,257.19 2,152.29 159.80 434.88 1,388.82 
% change 26.09 22.35 25.39 36.05 29.26 28.66 
       
Semarang (County) 
2005 4,481.00 596.03 2,108.70 169.91 354.84 1,251.88 
2010 5,560.55 709.06 2,585.79 206.23 474.08 1,585.40 
% change 24.09 18.96 22.62 21.38 33.60 26.64 
         
Semarang (City) 
2005 16,194.00 207.45 4,508.13 2,230.74 1,924.16 7,323.78 
2010 21,365.82 241.13 5,732.67 3,302.08 2,550.37 9,539.57 
% change 31.94 16.23 27.16 48.03 32.54 30.25 
       
Central Java 
2005 133,578.04 29,925.00 46,106.00 7,961.00 14,313.00 44,747.00 
2010 176,187.00 34,955.96 61,390.10 11,014.60 19,029.72 60,605.10 
% change 31.90 16.81 33.15 38.36 32.95 35.44 
       
Indonesia 
2005 1,539,110.69 267,679.00 431,628.00 89,900.00 148,618.00 752,402.00 
2010 2,359,127.70 374,814.89 584,576.76 106,022.34 183,577.04 902,413.95 
% change 53.28 40.02 35.44 17.93 23.52 19.94 
              
Source: Indonesian Bureau of Statistic(BPS)     
Note: Gross Domestic Regional Product is reported using constant base price of year 2000, discounting yearly 
inflation rate to provide net industrial (sectoral) growth. Numbers presented here excludes oil & gas revenues. 
* The "other" category includes revenues from mining & excavations, utilities sectors, hotels & restaurants, 
transportation & communications, and finance & commercial services 
 
